

ORIGEN'S DUAL DOCTRINE OF GOD AND LOGOS

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There is no better statement to introduce Origen's importance for the understanding of the historical lineage of Christianity and Greek Philosophy and for his decisive influence upon the subsequent thinkers, than that of Scholarius: «Where Origen was good no one is better; where he was bad, no one is worse»¹.

To Origen then, the disciple of Clement and Ammonius, was deserved the credit and glory of indissolubly linking vital christian beliefs on to Greek Philosophy. If such an attempt was for Origen a necessity, the same is true for every christian thinker, if he is to give an intelligible account of his christian beliefs. From the same attempt sprang the entire theology of the Councils and of the Middle Ages from Saint Anselm down to Saint Bonaventura and Saint Thomas. In the seventeenth century, Descartes, Leibniz and Malebranch obeyed the same rule².

The relation of Origen to Ammonius is a question still in debate and, therefore, what Origen owes to him is beyond identification; but there is no doubt that his works display a first hand acquaintance with all the contemporary philosophical schools, especially with those of Neoplatonism, Stoicism and Neo-pythagorism. But it is Platonism, above all, that determines his way of thinking. He takes for granted the platonic conception of the metaphysical structure of the world and its division into higher and lower, eternal and temporal, intelligible and sensible³. He is, in other words, «blinded» by Greek παιδεία⁴, and his mind is filled with Platonism⁵.

1. Quoted from *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition* by H. Chadwick. Oxford 1966, p. 95.

2. Eug. Faye, *Origen and his Work*, transl. by F. Rothwell, London 1926, p. 28.

3. C. Celsus, III, 72. Migne, P. G. 11, 1013C; All the references, unless otherwise indicated, are made in accordance with J. P. Migne *Patrologiae Cursus Completus series Graeca*, Paris, 1857-66 cited hereafter as M.P.G; See Bibliography.

4. According to his adversary Epiphanius. *Panarion Haer.* 64, 72, 9.

5. Eusebius, *Contra Marcellum*, 1,4. B.E.II.E.Σ. 29,29.

Origen is convinced that Christianity ought to use Philosophy because of the converted pagans who were trained in Philosophy, for its self-defence against accusations of paganism, and also as «an antitote» against the heresy of Gnosticism⁶. Other reasons that urged Origen to introduce Philosophy to Christianity and use philosophical concepts for the interpretation of the latter, are his particular emphasis on scientific and systematic knowledge. «There is a great difference between knowledge conjoined with faith (πιστεύειν ἐγνωκέναι) and faith only» (πιστεύειν μόνον); and that it is «by wisdom of God that God ought to be known»⁷. Thus he makes a distinction between those who have simple faith and those who use philosophy in their religion. The former as believers are in the process of elementary learning (εἰσαγόμενοι), whereas the latter are the perfect (τέλειοι)⁸. The perfect are in possession of the «intelligence they received from God» and therefore cannot be easily deceived and adhere to God «through love» and not «through fear and dread».⁹ But above all the perfect are able to discuss expertly on the «faith in God, the Mystery of Christ, and the unity of the Holy Spirit»¹⁰. In the préface of his *De Principiis* he states that the «holy apostles... took certain doctrines, those namely which they believed to be necessary ones, and delivered them in the plainest terms to all believers, even to such as appeared to be somewhat dull in the investigation of the divine knowledge. The grounds of their statements they left to be investigated by such as should merit the higher gifts of the Spirit. ...The men I refer to are those who train themselves to become worthy and capable of receiving wisdom»¹¹. So everyone who is «desirous of constructing... a connected body of doctrine» must proceed in accordance with the commandment which says: «Enlighten yourselves with the light of knowledge»¹². «Thus», he concludes, «by clear and cogent arguments he will discover

6. H. A. W a l f s o n, *The philosophy of the Church Fathers*, Harvard Univ. Press 1955. p. 13.

7. C. C e l s u m, I,13 «πολλῶ διαφέρει μετὰ λόγου καὶ σοφίας συγκατατίθεσθαι τοῖς δόγμασιν, ἢ περ μετὰ ψιλῆς πίστεως... ὅτι ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐχρῆν γινώσκεισθαι τὸν Θεόν».

8. Comm. in *Matth.* XII, 30... «ὁ Λόγος τοῖς μὲν εἰσαγομένοις ἔχει δούλου μορφῆν... τοῖς δὲ τελείοις ἔρχεται ἐν τῇ δόξῃ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ... καὶ γὰρ τοῖς τελείοις φαίνεται ἡ δόξα τοῦ Λόγου».

9. Hom. in *Genes.* VII, 4 «Spiritualiter ergo omnes quidem qui per fidem veniunt ad agnitionem Dei... Sed in his sunt aliqui pro charitate adhaerentes Deo, alii pro metu et timore futuri iudicii».

10. Hom. in *Levit.* XIII, 3; «et tu ergo si habes scientiam secretorum, si de fide Dei, de mysterio Christi, de Sancti Spiritus unitate potes scienter cauteque disserere».

11. I,3 ed. Butterworth.

12. Hosea X, 12.

the truth about each particular point and so will produce... a single body of doctrine, with the aid of such illustrations and declarations as he shall find in the holy scriptures and of such conclusions as he shall ascertain to follow logically from them when rightly understood»¹³. It is evident from these passages that faith, for Origen, is not enough: it needs philosophy and philosophical concepts for its schematization and demonstration.

But the real problem for Origen is how to harmonize and blend, if possible, the purest Greek thought with the Jewish-Christian teaching, that is, how these two doctrines can coexist. The means by which Origen tries to give solution to this chronic problem is his allegorical method. Allegory offers him the «wonderful instrument for overcoming this difficulty».¹⁴ Scripture, says Origen, is like a man, in that it is composed of body, soul and mind. The body of scripture is its literal sense (γράμματα), or «visible things» (όρατά); the soul is the moral meaning, and the mind is the inner or non-literal sense. As such it becomes the proper method for the «true understanding of Scriptures» and for the discovery of «the ineffable mysteries» and «all the doctrines, for example, those which relate to «God and His only begotten Son», His nature, His relation to the Father, and «what also is the operation of the Son...»¹⁵. Now we can apply this to the Law. «The Law has a dual sense, one literal (πρός ρητόν) and the other «innerspiritual» - intellectual (πρός διάνοιαν), as also been shown by some before us»¹⁶.

The use and application of this dual method is clearly seen in his twofold demonstration of God's existence and creation of the world, of the generation of the Logos and of his relation to the «Word».

As a true child of Neoplatonism, Origen affirms that God is transcendent and alone (μόνος) and unique (εἷς)¹⁷, simple and of wholly intellectual nature «natura illa simplex», being in itself, God in himself (αὐτόθεος). He is not only above all, but even beyond reason and being per se, (ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας)¹⁸. He is above wisdom, truth

13. De Princ. I,10. ed. Butterworth.

14. Eug. Fa y e, op. cit. p. 72.

15. De Princ. IV, 2,7 ed. Butterworth.

16. C. C e l s u m, VII, 20; «φαμέν τοίνυν, ὅτι ὁ νόμος διττός ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν τις πρὸς ρητόν, ὁ δὲ πρὸς διάνοιαν, ὡς καὶ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν τινες ἐδίδαξαν... τὸ μὲν γράμμα εἶπεν (ὁ Παῦλος) ἀποκτέννει, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ πρὸς τὸ ρητόν· τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖν, ὅπερ ἴσo-δυναμεῖ τῷ πρὸς διάνοιαν» cf. 2 Cor. 3:6.

17. De Princ. I, 1,6 ed. Butterworth.

18. C. C e l s u m VII,38;

and eternal life¹⁹. Origen is here more of a platonist than Plato himself. He reminds us of Plato's words: «God is beyond substance in both dignity and power»²⁰. The «negative theology» was here entering the history of christian thought and it was to stay there²¹.

On the other hand this transcendent God is pre-eminently the Living One, a Person and conscious of Himself. This God has moral qualities and unites within Himself more particularly justice and goodness²² and is called genuinely good (αὐτοαγαθός). God acts from a distance, He yet makes His presence felt.

Although Origen rejects the platonic doctrine of an endless cyclic world he still maintains that the world must be without beginning or end, because the immutable Creator can never be conceived of as inactive²³. Creation is the consequence of an overflow of divine goodness and since there can never have been a time when divine goodness was inactive the spiritual cosmos is eternal. On the same principle, as it will be shown, Origen bases his assertion of the eternal generation of the Logos.

Nevertheless Origen maintains that these spiritual beings are creatures and dependent on the divine will. The same is true of matter. «In regard the matter... which God willed to exist, I cannot understand how so many distinguished men have supposed it to be uncreated, that is, not made by God himself the Creator of all things, but in its nature and power the result of chance... and they are guilty of like impiety in saying that matter is uncreated and co-eternal with the uncreated God»²⁴. God has therefore made each creature perfect in its own kind²⁵

19. Comm. in John II, 23, XIII, 3;

20. Rep. VI 509B. «ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος».

21. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the middle Ages, Random House N. Y. 1955 p. 37.

22. De Princ. II, 5,3.

23. De Princ. I, 2, 10; 4. 3-4. ed. Butterworth «Ἐπει δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε παντοκράτωρ οὐκ ἦν, ἀεὶ εἶναι δεῖ ταῦτα δι' ἃ παντοκράτωρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀεὶ ἦν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κρατούμενα, ἄρχοντι αὐτῷ χρώμενα». Methodius, Bishop of Patara in Lycia criticises Origen's use of the argument as insufficiently safeguarding the freedom of God. Cf. Photius Bibli. 235. α 30;

24. De Princ. II 1,4 ed. Butterworth. «Hanc ergo materiam, quae esse voluit Deus-nescio quomodo tanti et tales viri, ingenitam, id est non ab ipso Deo factam conditor omnium putaverunt, sed fortuitam quamdam ejus naturam virtutemque dixerunt... Cum ipsi quoque similem culpam impietatis incurrant, ingenitam dicentes esse materiam Deoque ingenito coaeternam».

25. Comm. in John, XIII, 37.

and created all that he could reach, emprace and subject to his Providence²⁶.

The same dual interpretation holds for the Logos. In a characteristic passage Origen states that the «generation of the Logos is eternal and everlasting as the brightness which is produced from the sun»²⁷. In another passage he states that «the Father did not generate the Son and dismiss him after he was generated, but he is always generating him (ἀεὶ γεννᾷ)²⁸. He is the pre-existent eternal Logos through whom we pray to the Father²⁹, and whom we may describe as a «second God» beside the Father³⁰, since the Father and the Son are one in power and in will³¹. In another important for our discussion passage Origen states that «there never was a time when he was not»³², but the terms «never» and «when» are to be understood as transcending all time, all ages and all eternity. The generation of the Logos, according to this statement, is not a thought in the mind of God, as Philo and Justin had taught, but rather the act of the generation itself is an eternally continuous process.

The above description of the generation of the Logos by Origen, reminds us of the plotinian description of the generation of the Nous from the One: «It is a surrounding splendor which proceeds from the One, but the One which remains at rest, like the splendid light surrounding the sun, which is always been generated (ἀεὶ γεννώμενον) from the sun, while the sun itself remains at rest»³³ and «since there was no time when He began to be», for «He was before time», His existence is one with His creating and, in a manner of speaking, with his eternal generation (γεννήσει ἀϊδίῳ)³⁴.

26. De Princ. II, 9,1 «πεποίηκε τοίνυν τσαῦτα, ὅσων ἡδύνατο περιδράξασθαι καὶ ἔχειν ὑπὸ χεῖρα καὶ συκρατεῖν ὑπὸ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πρόνοιαν».

27. De Princ. I, 2,4. «est namque ita aeterna ac sempiterna generatio sicut splendor generatur ex luce». and Hom. in Jerem. IX, 4 «ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς αἰδίου».

28. Hom. in Jerem. IX 4 «ὅτι οὐχὶ ἐγέννησεν ὁ Πατὴρ τὸν Υἱόν, καὶ ἀπέλυσεν αὐτὸν ὁ Πατὴρ ἀπὸ γενέσεως αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ γεννᾷ αὐτόν».

29. De Orat. XV-XVI; Contr. Celsum V 4-5 and VIII 26.

30. C. Celsum V, 39; VI, 64; VII, 57. Comm. in John II, 2, X 37.

31. C. Celsum VIII. 12.

32. De Princ. IV, 4,1. «Nam et haec ipsa nomina temporalis vocabuli significantiam gerunt, id est quando vel nunquam, supra omnia saecula, et supra omnem aeternitatem intelligenda sunt».

33. Enn. V, 1,6 «περὶ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ὄν, περιλαμψὶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν λαμπρὸν ὡσπερ περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον, μένοντος δέ».

34. Enn. VI, 8,20.

These quotations make evident the common source from which Plotinus and Origen draw their respective doctrines of generation. Origen of course departs in some respect from Plotinus when he describes the generation of the Logos as an act of God's will. Origen uses this modified form of generation of Logos when he rejects the Gnostic conception of the generation of Logos according to which there was once a time when he did not exist. Origen's rejection runs as follows: «Putting away all corporeal conceptions, we say that the Logos or wisdom was begotten out of the invisible and incorporeal without any corporeal feeling, as if it were an act of the will proceeding from the mind»³⁵. The generation of the Logos, consequently is an act of the will, but not of the «corporeal passion» characteristic of the generation of «animals and men»³⁶. The divine will does not contain such deficiencies because it is an «act of pure mind and thought and goodness, which are identical with his essence». There is a considerable transition and change that take place here from the necessary emanation to the generation of Logos from the eternal act of the will and intelligence³⁷. This crucial transition seems to appear in the following passage: «Seeing that He (Logos) is called the Son of love, it will not appear absurd if in this way He be called Son of Will»³⁸. H. Langerbeck³⁹ calls this transition the «acme of ancient christian Aristotelianism». Any way in this part of interpretation of the Logos, Origen makes full use of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic (of the Plotinian type) concepts in order to make the relation of Logos to Father more intelligible.

The Logos is, on the other hand, conceived by Origen as the image of the Father's power, not an image of the Father so identical with the archetype that he can be said to be as much Father as the Father himself⁴⁰. The Logos in no way is compared with the Father, for he is an image of his goodness, an effulgence (ἀπαύγασμα), radiating not from God but from his glory and from his eternal light, a beam, not of the

35. De Princ. IV, 4,1.

36. De Princ. IV, 4,1. «Εἰ γὰρ προβολὴ ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Πατρὸς, καὶ γεννᾶ μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὅποια τὰ τῶν ζῴων γεννήματα, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸν προβάλλοντα καὶ τὸν προβαλλόμενον».

37. «No one will wish to deny», says H. Langerbeck, «that here a specifically christian ontology and epistemology is being formulated, and with a clarity and awareness». «The philosophy of Ammonius Saccas» εἰς Journal of Hellenic Studies vol. 77 (1957) p. 72.

38. De Princ. IV, 4,1. «Nec absurdum videbitur, cum dicatur Filius charitatis, si hoc modo etiam voluntatis putetur».

39. Op. cit. p. 72.

40. Comm. in John XIII, 25.

Father, but of his power⁴¹. Since the Logos was made flesh and became visible, he cannot be said to be equal with the Father. This is the reason why Origen says that Christ is not as good in itself. There is only one absolute Good, God the Father, of whom Christ is but an image⁴². Origen, in support of this interpretation, advocates «the Father is greater than I»⁴³. All rational beings participate in the rationality of the divine Logos who is the archetypal source of their nature, and the mediator between the Father and the creatures. «The God and Father, who holds the universe together, is superior to every being that exists, for he imparts to each one from his one existence that which each one is; the Son, being less than the Father, is superior to rational creatures alone (for he is second to the Father)»⁴⁴.

Origen therefore made a distinction between «the God by right of self» (αὐτόθεος) with article, and the begotten Son, who as an image and resemblance, was simply called «God» without article. The word is to what comes after him, what the Father is to him. «The Word», in other words, is divine but not God⁴⁵. Thus the Logos (Word) is the image after which all other images are made.

The subordination of the Word to the Father by Origen is undoubtedly⁴⁶ due to the philonian interpretation of the platonic εἶδη «thoughts of the divine mind». Origen of course rejects the ideas as having existence only in mind and thought as a mere fancy or as a fleeting stream⁴⁷. Here Origen seems to have in mind the Stoic interpretation of, and in opposition to, Plato's ideas as thoughts of our mind (ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα) but he did not reject «the other real world» for, «the Savior came from thence or that the saints will go thither»⁴⁸ and which has been made «after the second day»⁴⁹. This is more fully stated in the following pas-

41. Comm. in John XIII, 3.

42. Comm. in John XIII, 3.

43. John 4,26. «Ὁ πατήρ μείζων μου ἐστίν».

44. De Princ. I, 3, 5. «Ὁ μὲν Θεὸς καὶ πατήρ συνέχων τὰ πάντα φθάνει εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, μεταδιδούς ἑκάστῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου τὸ εἶναι, ὅπερ ἐστίν, ἐλαττόνως δὲ παρὰ τὸν πατέρα ὁ υἱὸς φθάνων ἐπὶ μόνα τὰ λογικά... δεύτερος γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ πατρὸς».

45. Comm. in John II, 3.

46. On account of this subordination Origen is called by Gennadius the Father of Arianism. Cf. Chadwich op. cit. p. 95 and Gilson op. cit. p. 272, n. 27.

47. De Princ. II, 3,6. «ne forte praebeatur aliquibus occasio, illius intelligentiae, quam putent nos imagines quasdam quas Graeci ἰδέας nominant affirmare; quod utique a nostris alienum est, mundum incorporeum dicere, in solo mentis phantasia vel cogitationum lubrico consistentem».

48. De Princ. II, 3,6.

49. De Princ. II, 3,6;

sage where he speaks of the meaning of the passage «in the beginning God made the heaven and the earth»⁵⁰. «For it was shown that there is another «heaven» and another «earth» besides the firmament, which is said to have been made after the second day, and the «dry land», which was afterwards called «earth»⁵¹. It is «that heaven and earth from which this present heaven and earth, which we now see, afterwards borrowed their names»⁵². This is in other words, the ideal heaven and earth which our visible heaven and earth imitates. This other world is also described by Origen as consisting of things which are «invisible» (ἀόρατα) and «incorporeal» (ἀσώματα)⁵³ and as containing certain ideas which are called «the true and living forms, the heavenly things, of which the mosaic law is a copy and shadow», that is, the ideal «pattern» (παράδειγμα) of the world⁵⁴.

It is worth noticing Origen's discussion of the location of this other world. «But whether that world to which He (Christ) desires to allude be far separated and divided from this, either by situation or nature or glory, or whether it be superior in glory and quality, but confined within the limits of this world which seems to me more probable is nevertheless uncertain, and in my opinion an unsuitable subject for human thought»⁵⁵. He is inclined therefore to place that world «within the limits of this world» and not in the Logos.

In *Contr. Celsum* VI, 64, Origen raises the question whether «the only begotten»⁵⁶, and «first born of all creation»⁵⁷ is to be called ousia of ousias (οὐσία οὐσιῶν) and idea of ideas (ἰδέα ἰδεῶν) and archê (ἀρχή)⁵⁸, while his Father is above all these⁵⁹.

50. Genes. 1,10. 8. Cf. Hom. in Genes. I, 1,2 and Hom. in Psalm. II, 4.

51. De Princ. II,3,6. «Aliud enim coelum et alia terra indicatur esse quam post bidum factum dicitur, vel arida quae postmodum terra nuncupatur».

52. De Princ. II, 9,1;

53. Ibid.

54. De Princ. III, 6,8. «In qua terra puto esse veras illas et vivas formas illius observantiae...». Cf. Heb. VIII, 3 «ὑποδείγματι καὶ σκιᾷ λατρεύουσι τῶν ἐπουρανίων».

55. De Princ. II, 3,6. «Sed utrum mundus iste quem sentiri vult, separatus ab hoc sit longeque divisus, vel loco, vel qualitate, vel gloria; an gloria quidem et qualitate praecellat, intratomen huius mundi circumscriptionem cohibeatur, quod et mihi magis verisimile videtur, incertum tamen est, et ut ego arbitror, humanis ad huc cogitationibus et mentibus inusitatum».

56. John I, 14;

57. Col. I, 15.

58. This reflects Philo's «archetypal pattern» (παράδειγμα ἀρχέτυπον): De Opificio Mundi, 6,25;

59. C. Celsum VI, 64 «Ζητητέον δὲ καὶ εἰ οὐσίαν μὲν οὐσιῶν λεκτέον, καὶ ἰδέαν

In his Comm. in John⁶⁰, Origen, in interpreting the verse «In the beginning was the Logos», states that all things are created according to the wisdom and the models (τύπους) of the system of the intelligible things (νοημάτων), in it. «For I think that just as a house and a ship are built or fabricated in accordance with the models of the architects, seeing that a house and a ship have the models and logoi in their architect as their origin, so also all things have been created in accordance with the logoi of future things previously manifested by God in wisdom»⁶¹. The christian Logos then, like the architect, contains the ideal models and intelligible plans of the sensible world.

In the same commentary in an address to the reader Origen says: «You may investigate whether in any sense the first born of creation⁶² can be the cosmos, in so far as he is the manifold wisdom⁶³, for since (in wisdom) are logoi of anything whatever, in accordance with which all things made by God in wisdom came into being, as the prophet says, «In Wisdom hast thou made them all»,⁶⁴ then in him (the first born) would also be the (intelligible) cosmos itself which is much more manifold than the sensible cosmos and differs from it as the matterless Logos, which is the instrument of the creation of the whole cosmos, differs from the enmattered cosmos, the latter of which is a cosmos or an ordered harmonious whole not on account of its matter but on account of the participation in the Logos and in the Wisdom which brings order to the matter of all ordered things»⁶⁵.

It is evident from the above quoted passage a) that the Logos or Wisdom was prior to the creation of the world, b) that it contained the

ιδεῶν, καὶ ἀρχήν, τὸν Μονογενῆ καὶ πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, ἐπέκεινα δὲ πάντων τούτων τὸν Πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεόν».

60. I, 22.

61. Comm. in John I, 22 Preus. «Οἶμαι γὰρ ὡσπερ κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχιτεκτονικοὺς τύπους οἰκοδομεῖται ἢ τεκταίνεται οἰκία καὶ ναὺς ἀρχὴν τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τῆς νεὸς ἐχόντων τοὺς ἐν τῷ τεχνιτῇ τύπους καὶ λόγους· οὕτω τὰ σύμπαντα γεγονέναι κατὰ τοὺς ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ προτρανωθέντας ὑπὸ Θεοῦ τῶν ἐσομένων λόγους».

62. Col. I, 15.

63. Eph. 3:10.

64. Ps. 104:24.

65. Comm. in John I, 4, ed. Preus. «Ζητήσεις δὲ εἰ κατὰ τι τῶν σημαινομένων δύναται ὁ πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως εἶναι κόσμος καὶ μάλιστα καθ' ὃ σοφία ἐστὶν ἢ πολυποικίλος· τῷ γὰρ εἶναι πάντας οὐτινοσοῦν τοὺς λόγους, καθ' οὓς γεγένηται πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν σοφίᾳ πεποιημένα ὡς φησὶν ὁ προφήτης· «Πάντα ἐν σοφίᾳ ἐποίησας», ἐν αὐτῷ εἶη ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κόσμος, τοσοῦτω ποικιλώτερος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ κόσμου καὶ διαφέρων, ὅσῳ διαφέρει γυμνὸς πάσης ὕλης τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λόγος τοῦ ἐνύλου κόσμου».

intelligible world and ideas (logoi), c) that the sensible cosmos has come into being through the participation (μετοχή)⁶⁶ in the Logos, and d) that the pre-existent Christ with the Wisdom and the Logos as «first born of all creation» contains in himself the intelligible world of ideas. In a similar passage in *De Princ.*⁶⁷ «principles», «logoi» and the «forms» of all things to be created are contained within the Logos itself. The Logos and second God again, is a power which contains all the ideas, powers or logoi. «And although we speak of a second God (δεύτερον Θεόν), let men know that by the term *second God* we mean nothing else than a power (ἀρετήν-δύναμιν) which includes every Logos that exists in everything which has arisen naturally, directly and for the general advantage⁶⁸. Even the promises of God which we find in Scripture are related to the «Word», which was with God in the beginning as «parts of a whole or a species of a genus»⁶⁹. All these passages show clearly that Origen was wrestling with the problem of the relation of Logos to the Ideas. Once⁷⁰ he was inclined to place the other world outside the Logos, while in *Contr. Celsum*⁷¹ he leaves the same question unanswered. In other places⁷², in respect to the same question, he is inclined to place the ideas within the Logos. Elsewhere⁷³, Origen assumes that the ideas are contained in the Logos.

Origen, therefore, had to reconcile different theological and philosophical traditions such as Old and New Testament, Platonism and Aristotelianism, Philo and Ammonius. Because he was the first to under-

66. 'Participation' and 'imitation' are terms used by Plato when he describes the relation of the visible things to the ideas. Cf. *Parm.* 132 C10; *Tim.* 49 A.

67. I, 2, 2 «... creatum esse sapientia initium viarum Dei, continens scilicet, in semetipsa universae creaturae vel initia, vel formas, vel species».

68. *C. Celsum* V, 39. Ed. Chadwich «Κἀν δεύτερον οὖν λέγωμεν Θεόν ἴστωσαν, ὅτι τὸν δεύτερον Θεόν οὐκ ἄλλο τι λέγομεν ἢ τὴν περιεκτικὴν πασῶν ἀρετῶν ἀρετήν, καὶ τὸν περιεκτικὸν παντὸς οὐτινοσοῦν λόγον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ προηγουμένων γεγεννημένων καὶ εἰς χρήσιμον τοῦ παντὸς λόγου».

69. *C. Celsum* V, 22 «τηροῦμεν.. καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τοῦ Θεοῦ... οἱ περὶ ἐκάστου λόγου ὄντες, ὡς ἐν ὅλῳ μέρη, ἢ ὡς ἐν γένει εἶδη, τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ Λόγου πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν Θεοῦ λόγου».

70. *De Princ.* II, 3,6;

71. VI, 64;

72. *Comm. in John*, I, 2,2. XIX, 5.

73. *De Princ.* I, 2,2; *C. Celsum* V, 39. and V, 22.

take such an adventure, that is to harmonize and systematize those traditions, it was inevitable for him to give them a dual interpretation. Theology, then, and Philosophy can exist for Origen side by side. When they contradict, his allegorical method facilitates their co-existence. For many of his interpreters this was a risky task. Yet «all his interpreters unanimously agree that he was great»⁷⁴.

74. Gilson, *op. cit.* p. 43.