

KANT'S THEORY OF THE BEAUTIFUL
IN RELATION TO THE MORALLY GOOD*

Determination of Beauty in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*
as the Form of an Object without Definite Purpose

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(Illustration of My Subject by Narcissus' Legend)

Before I begin the treatment of my subject, I would like to illustrate it by a legend, the legend of Narcissus.

Who was Narcissus?...

As Greek mythology tells us, he was a young man of extraordi-

* Works, considered in this essay are the following: Kant, *Critique of Judgment* (Kritik der Urtheilskraft); tr. by J. H. Bernard, Hafner Publishing and Co., New York, 1961. *Kant Selections* (Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, Critique of Judgment); ed. by Theodore Meyer Greene, Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, U.S.A., 1929. Israel Knox, *The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1936. A.C. Ewing, *Kant's Treatment of Causality*, Trubner and Co., London, 1924. René Wellek, *The Philosophy, of Kant and Our Modern World*; ed. by C.W. Hendel, The Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1957. A. G. Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*; tr. by Karl Aschenbrenner and W.B. Holther, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954. Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*; printed for J. Davry, etc., London, 1726. Benedetto Croce, *Aesthetic*; tr. by Douglas Ainslie, The Noonday Press, New York, 1960. Leo Tolstoy, *What Is Art? and Essays on Art*; tr. by Aylmer Maude, A Hesperides Book, New York, 1962. Gregoris Papamihael, *The Triad of the Highest Values of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good from the Christian Point of View* (*Ἡ τριάς τῶν ὑψίστων ἀξιών τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀπὸ χριστιανικῆς σκοπιᾶς*), Academy of Athens, Athens, 1946 (in Greek). Philibus (Φίλιβος) in *The Dialogues of Plato*; tr. by Jowett, Random House, New York. Constantine Cavarnos, *Plato's Theory of Fine Art*, «Astir» Publishing Co., Athens. Ovid's *Metamorphoses*; tr. by Brookes More, The Coruhill Publishing Co., Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A. Thomas Edwards, *Cephalus and Procris. Narcissus*; ed. by W. Buckley, Published by Nichols and Sons, London, 1882.

nary beauty. His beauty was reflected on Nature which was joyful so long as Narcissus was joyful, too. In the brilliancy of his joy, the waters danced as they rolled down on their river beds and the trees sang as the wind blew through their leaves. The nymphs and the dryads flitted and chattered like uncaged warblers. They were delirious with love of joy. So beautiful was Narcissus that all the maidens loved him, but Narcissus did not love any of them because he had fallen in love with himself.

One day the young man stooped in a quiet pool of silvery water and saw in the water a miracle of beauty, his reflection; and he thought that this was a real creature. And he fell madly in love with the image... Neither eating nor sleeping, he suffered very much because he could not satisfy his love; until one day the fair Narcissus died. And in the place where he had died, as the poet says:

«Where he had been, alas he was not there!
And in his body's place a sweet flower grew
Golden and white, the white around the gold»¹.

This is the lovely flower which to this day bears Narcissus' name and which is as beautiful as Narcissus' body, the body from which this flower was born. But, between the beauty of Narcissus' flower and that of Narcissus himself, if we accept Kant's valuation of beauty, there is a difference; for the former, according to him, as beauty of flower, is free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*), while the latter, as human beauty, is dependent beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*)².

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

(Statement and Division of My Subject)

Kant's consideration of Beauty as free and dependent beauty is based on his distinction between purpose and purposiveness according to the third moment of «Relation» of cause to effect. In conclusion of his treatment of the beautiful which derives from the third moment Kant says the following at the end of the third section of the «Analytic of the Beautiful»: «Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, so far as this is perceived in it without any representation of a pur-

1. Ovid's *Metamorphoses*; tr. by Brookes More, The Coruhill Publishing Co., Boston Massachusetts, U.S.A., vol. I, bk. III, p. 112.

2. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*; tr. by J. H. Bernard, Hafner Publishing Co., New York, 1961, § 16, pp. 65, 66; see also § 17, p. 73n.

pose»³. From this explanation of Kant, then, I derive the subtitle of this essay on the Beautiful: *Kant's Determination of Beauty as the Form of the Purposiveness of an Object without Definite Purpose*.

According to Kant's distinction between purposiveness which concerns free beauty and purpose which concerns dependent beauty, I divide my subject into two parts:

I. *Purposiveness and Beauty*, where I treat beauty without definite purpose, that is, free beauty which is independent from the morally good.

II. *Beauty and Goodness*, where I treat dependent beauty, that is, beauty with the definite purpose of the perfection or the morally good.

PART I

PURPOSIVENESS AND BEAUTY¹

A. PURPOSIVENESS IN GENERAL

(The Relation of Purposiveness to the Cognitive Faculties)

1. Purposiveness and the Three Cognitive Faculties

The basic question, not only of this particular section about the third moment of the judgment of taste, but of the *Critique of Judgment* in general is the question of purposiveness which Kant defines in terms of the *Relation of Causality* (viz. the relation of cause to effect)². Kant distinguishes *purposiveness* from *purpose*. «The purpose», he says, «is the object of a concept, in so far as the concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a *concept* in respect of its *object* is its purposiveness (*forma finalis*)»³.

We can understand better the meaning of purposiveness, if we consider its relation to the three cognitive faculties, viz. understanding, judgment, and reason⁴ which correspond to the three capacities or fac-

3. Ibid. § 17, p. 73.

1. This part concerns mainly §§ 10 -14 of the *Critique of Judgment*.

2. *Critique of Pure Reason*, «Transcendental Analytic», bk. I, ch. I, iii.

3. *Critique of Judgment* § 10, p. 55; see also Kant's Introduction IV, p. 17.

4. About the three cognitive faculties see Kant's introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, III, pp. 13-15, and IX, p. 34.

ulties of the soul: the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty of desire⁵. I shall examine here this relation with special reference to the judgment of taste to which purposiveness mainly refers.

Kant says in general that «the judgment of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation)»⁶. And he proceeds to the proof of this statement as follows: «Every purpose», he says, «if it be regarded as a ground of satisfaction, always carries with it an interest»⁷. But, since «the satisfaction which determines the judgment of taste is disinterested»⁸, we can understand that the judgment of taste is independent of purpose, and therefore of concept, for «purpose in general is that whose *concept* can be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself»⁹. The judgment of taste, therefore, has to do with no concept of the object, «but merely with the relation of the representative powers to one another, so far as they are determined by a representation»¹⁰. So, «it can be nothing else than the state of mind» «in the free play of the imagination and the understanding (so far as they agree with each other, as is requisitive for *cognition in general*)». The cognitive powers in this kind of cognition which is distinguished by Kant from a definite cognition are in free play «because no definite concept limits them to a definite [particular] rule of cognition»¹¹.

In other words, while in a logico-scientific judgment knowledge of an object is gained by means of the *a priori* categories of Understanding, in the aesthetic judgment or the judgment of taste the beautiful object is perceived as exhibiting a purposiveness without purpose, «without a definite end expressible by means of concepts»¹².

«In the expression *purposiveness without purpose* (*Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck*)», as Israel Knox remarks, «Kant wants to say that it is the form of purposiveness of an object which affords the satisfaction that is universally communicable without the aid of a reflective idea,

5. Ibid. III, p. 13.

6. Ibid. § 11, p. 56 (subtitle).

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid. § 2, p. 38 (subtitle).

9. Ibid. § 15, p. 63.

10. Ibid. § 11, p. 56.

11. Ibid. § 9, p. 52.

12. A. C. Ewing, *Kant's Treatment of Causality*, Trubner and Co., London, 1924, p. 222.

and that, consequently, there can be a union of the Imagination and the Understanding in a judgment of taste that is *not* cognitive. In this judgment a concept is present, but it is the general concept of the agreement of the form of an object with the cognitive faculties—that is to say, a sort of cognition takes place in which the Understanding participates but is not determined by definite concepts. The adaptation of the object to the contemplating subject merely indicates an *inner causality* in the subject as regards *cognition in general* without being confined to any specific condition¹³. Kant himself says that «the consciousness of the mere formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive powers, in a representation through which an object is given, is the pleasure itself, because it contains a determining ground of the activity of the subject in respect of the excitement of its cognitive power, and therefore an inner causality (which is purposive) in respect of cognition in general, without however being limited to any definite cognition»¹⁴.

This pleasure with which purposiveness has to do is the *contemplative* pleasure, that is, the pleasure which is not necessarily bound up with the desire of the object; it is, therefore, different from the *practical* pleasure which concerns purpose, that is, the pleasure which is necessarily bound up with the desire¹⁵, or the will, for «the desire, so far as it is determinate to act only through concept, i. e. in conformity with the representation of a purpose, would be the will... There can be, then, purposiveness without purpose, so far as we do not place the causes of this form in a will»¹⁶.

2. Subjective and Objective Purposiveness

The consciousness of this mere formal purposiveness, which, as we said, is the pleasure itself, «contains a mere form of the subjective purposiveness»¹⁷ «in the representation of an object without any purpose»¹⁸. This subjective purposiveness is distinguished from *objective* purposive-

13. Israel Knox, *The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1936, p. 33.

14. *Critique of Judgment* § 12, pp. 57-58; see also § 10, p. 55.

15. About the two kinds of pleasure, *contemplative* and *practical*, see *Metaphysic of Morals*, Introduction I (Passage quoted by Bernard in the *Critique of Judgment* § 12, p. 57n.); see also *Critique of Judgment* § 5, pp. 43-44.

16. *Critique of Judgment* § 10, p. 55.

17. *Ibid.* § 13, p. 58.

18. *Ibid.* § 14, p. 56.

ness, which «can only be cognized by means of the reference of the manifold to a definite purpose, and therefore only through a concept»¹⁹.

So, Kant distinguishes two kinds of purposiveness. The one is formal and subjective, the other real and objective. The subjective purposiveness is represented «in an object given in experience on a merely subjective ground as the harmony of its form—in the *apprehension* (*apprehensio*) of it prior to any concept—with the cognitive faculties». The objective purposiveness, on the other hand, is represented «objectively as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the thing itself, according to a concept of it which precedes and contains the ground of this form»²⁰. The representation of purposiveness of the first kind rests on the feeling of pleasure in things, while the representation of purposiveness of the second kind has to do with understanding and reason (logical, according to concepts)²¹.

On this double representation of purposiveness (subjective and objective) and two corresponding ways of judging, the one «by taste (aesthetical, by the medium of the feeling of pleasure)», the other «by understanding and reason (logical, according to concepts)», is based by Kant «the division of the *Critique of Judgment* into the critique of *aesthetical* and of *teleological* judgment». By the first, as he explains, «we understand the faculty of judging of the formal purposiveness (otherwise called subjective) of nature by means of the feeling of pleasure or pain; by the second, the faculty of judging its real (objective) purposiveness by means of understanding and reason»²².

3. Importance of Purposiveness

From what we said above, we can understand the importance of purposiveness in Kant's *Critique of Judgment* in general. In his definition of purposiveness, which we find in the introduction to this book, Kant distinguishes purposiveness from purpose as follows: «The concept of an object», he says, «so far as it contains the ground of the actuality

19. *Ibid.* § 15, p. 62.

20. *Ibid.* VIII, p. 29 (*Kant's Introduction*).

21. *Ibid.* VIII, p. 30. Kant talks of the subjective purposiveness in his Introduction, in the paragraph VII entitled «Of the Aesthetical Representation of the Purposiveness of Nature» (pp. 25ff.); and of the objective purposiveness in the next paragraph VIII entitled «Of the Logical Representation of the Purposiveness of Nature» (pp. 29ff.).

22. *Ibid.* VIII, p. 30; see also translator's introduction, p. xvii.

of this object, is the purpose; and the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is only possible according to purpose is called the *purposiveness* of its form. Thus the principle of judgment, in respect of the form of things of nature under empirical laws generally, is the *purposiveness of nature* in its variety. That is, nature is represented by means of this concept as if an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the variety of its empirical laws. The purposiveness of nature is therefore a particular concept, *a priori*, which has its origin solely in the reflective judgment²³. For this reason, Kant explains, «in a critique of judgment the part containing the aesthetical judgment is essential, because this alone contains a principle which the judgment places quite *a priori* at the basis of its reflection upon nature, viz. the principle of a formal purposiveness of nature, according to its particular (empirical) laws, for our cognitive faculty, without which the understanding could not find itself in nature»²⁴.

This principle, therefore, the principle of the purposiveness of nature is «the fundamental principle underlying the procedure of the judgment»²⁵. Considering this, we can understand that «the main question with which the *Critique of Judgment* is concerned is the question as to the purposiveness, the *Zweckmässigkeit*, exhibited by nature»²⁶.

4. The Concept of the Purposiveness of Nature (*Critique of Judgment*) as the Mediating Link between the Realm of the Natural Concept (*Critique of Pure Reason*) and That of the Concept of Freedom (*Critique of Practical Reason*)

This concept of the purposiveness of nature «fit to be», according to Kant, is «the mediating link between the realm of the natural concept and that of the concept of freedom in its effects»²⁷. «There are two kinds of concepts», according to Kant, «viz. *natural concepts* and the *concept of freedom*. The former render possible *theoretical* cognition according to principle *a priori*; the latter... furnishes fundamental propositions which extend the sphere of the determination of the will and are therefore

23. Ibid. III, p. 17.

24. Ibid. VIII, p. 30.

25. J. H. Bernard in his Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, p. XVII.

26. Ibid., p. XXII.

27. Ibid. IX, p. 34 (Kant's Introduction); see also III, pp. 13,15 and Preface, p. 4.

called practical. Thus philosophy is correctly divided into two parts, quite distinct in their principles: the theoretical part, or *Natural Philosophy*; and the practical part, or *Moral Philosophy* (for that is the name given to the practical legislation of reason in accordance with the concept of freedom)²⁸.

The judgment, therefore, furnishing «the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and that of freedom, makes possible the transition from the conformity to law in accordance with the former to the final purpose in accordance with the latter, and this by the concept of a *purposiveness* of nature»²⁹. So, the *Critique of Judgment* which «Kant himself regarded as the coping-stone of his critical edifice»³⁰ is the mediating link between the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the transition from *Natural Philosophy* (theoretical) to *Moral Philosophy* (practical).

B. PURPOSIVENESS AND THE PURE JUDGMENT OF TASTE
(The Relation of the Pure Judgment
of Taste to Charm and Emotion)

1. Purposiveness and the Pure Judgment of
Taste (Division of the Aesthetical Judgment
into Empirical and Pure)

After the general account of purposiveness (subjective and objective) and its relation to judgment (aesthetical and teleological), let us see now in particular the relation of mere purposiveness to the aesthetical judgment or the judgment of taste. As Kant explains, «the judgment is called aesthetical just because its determining ground is not a concept, but the feeling (of internal sense) of that harmony in the play of the mental powers, so far as it can be felt in sensation»³¹. Concerning their division, the «aesthetical judgments can be divided just like theoretical (logical) judgments into empirical and pure. The first assert pleasantness or unpleasantness; the second assert the beauty of an object

28. Ibid. I, p. 7.

29. Ibid. IX, p. 33; see also Kant's table of all the higher faculties according to their systematic unity at the end of his introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* (IX, p. 34).

30. Ibid., p. xvi (Translator's Introduction).

31. Ibid. § 15, p. 65.

or of the manner of representing it. The former are judgments of sense (material aesthetical judgments); the latter [as formal] are alone strictly judgments of taste»³².

2. Independence of the Pure Judgment of Taste from Charm and Emotion

Considering, then, the above distinction of the judgments (that between judgments of sense and judgments of taste) we can understand that «a judgment of taste on which charm and emotion have no influence (although they may be bound up with the satisfaction in the beautiful) — which therefore has as its determining ground merely the purposiveness of the form — is a *pure judgment of taste*»³³. Thus the pure judgment of taste arises from the feeling of purposiveness and is independent of the charms of sense or the emotions of mere feeling.

3. Kant's Theory of Design and Color in the Fine Arts

In his discussion of color in painting and tone in music, Kant says that «the sensations of colors and of tone have a right to be regarded as beautiful only in so far as they are *pure*»³⁴. «Hence all simple colors, so far as they are pure, are regarded as beautiful; composite colors have not this advantage»³⁵. Thus Kant puts forwards the curious doctrine that «color in a picture is only an extraneous charm, and does not really add to the beauty of the form delineated, nay rather distracts the mind from it»³⁶. So, to speak with Kant's own words, «in painting, sculpture, and in all the formative arts — in architecture and horticulture, so far as they are beautiful arts — the *delineation* is the essential thing; and here it is not what gratifies in sensation but what pleases by means of its form that is fundamental for taste. The colors which light up the sketch belong to the charm... The *charm* of colors or of the pleasant tones of an instrument may be added, but the *delineation* in the first case and the

32. Ibid. § 14, p. 59. The *scent* of a flower, for example, is impure while the *shape* of the shape of the flower produces pure pleasure.

33. Ibid. § 13, p. 59.

34. Ibid. § 14, p. 59.

35. Ibid. § 14, p. 60.

36. Ibid. p. xxi (Translator's Introduction).

composition in the second constitute the proper object of the pure judgment of taste»³⁷.

This emphasis of Kant on delineation in the fine arts makes Israel Knox say that «it is the enunciation of the most consistent, the most extreme, and the most dialectically impeccable formalism in the history of aesthetic»³⁸. René Wellek accepts also that «in some of his reflections Kant is surely in danger of falling into an extreme formalism. He emphasizes, for instance, design in the fine arts and would apparently dispense with color as a mere sensual stimulus»³⁹. However, J. H. Bernard finds Kant's criticisms on this point to be characterized by a poverty because if they were sound, they would make «Flaxman a truer artist than Titian or Paolo Veronese. But indeed his discussion of painting or music is not very appreciative; he was, to the end, a creature of pure reason»⁴⁰.

The *charm* of sense or *emotion*, according to Kant, «that is the sensation in which pleasantness is produced by means of a momentary checking and a consequently more powerful outflow of the vital force, does not belong at all to beauty»⁴¹. So, the emotions of mere feeling for Kant are not related to the pleasure taken in pure beauty. The pure judgment of taste is independent from them.

4. Kant Compared to Winckelmann

It is interesting on this point to see Kant's similarities with Winckelmann. Like Kant, who characterizes as aesthetical judgment that which has its determining ground not a concept, but «the feeling (of internal sense)»⁴², Winckelmann does also the same when he says that to perceive pure beauty, «a fine internal sense» is required. So, according to Benedetto Croce, «having asserted beauty to be something supersensible, it is not suprising that Winckelmann should wish, if not wholly to exclude colour, at least to reduce it to a minimum, and treat it not as a constitutive element in beauty but as secondary ancillary. True beauty is given in form: by which he means line and surface, forgetting that

37. Ibid. § 14, p. 61.

38. I. Knox, *The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer*, p. 39.

39. René Wellek, «Aesthetics and Criticism» in *The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World*; ed. by C.W. Hendel, The Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1957, p. 86.

40. *Critique of Judgment*, p. xxi (Translator's Introduction).

41. Ibid. § 14, p. 62.

42. Ibid. § 15, p. 65.

these are only apprehended by the senses, and could not be seen without being in some way coloured»⁴³.

Considering Winckelmann's theory about form and color in reference to the charms of sense or the emotions of mere feeling, we can understand his influence on Kant who, like Winckelmann, accepts that «a pure judgment of taste has for its determining ground neither charm nor emotion — in a word, no sensation as the material of the aesthetical judgment»⁴⁴.

Kant does not accept only the independence of the pure judgment of taste from charm and emotion, but also the independence of pure beauty from perfection. Considering that perfection has to do with moral good, I proceed now to the examination of «Beauty in Relation to Goodness» in a second, separate part of this essay.

PART II

BEAUTY AND GOODNESS¹

A. THE RELATION OF BEAUTY TO PERFECTION

(Independence of Beauty from Goodness)

1. Perfection as Purpose (Independence of Beauty from the Concept of Perfection)

Before I begin to speak of the relation between Beauty and Goodness, let me explain in general about perfection to which the moral good refers.

Perfection as a purpose has to do not with formal subjective purposiveness which is without definite purpose, but with objective purposiveness which, according to Kant, «is either external, i.e. the *utility*, or internal, i.e. the *perfection* of the object»². Kant distinguishes in gen-

43. B. Croce, *Aesthetic*; tr. by Douglas Ainslie, The Noonday Press, New York, 1960, p. 264. See also Winckelmann's *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums*, bk. VI. ch. 2, § 19 to which Croce refers in his discussion about Winckelmann's theory of form and color.

44. *Critique of Judgment* § 14, p. 62.

1. This part concerns mainly §§ 15-17 of the *Critique of Judgment*.

2. Ibid. § 15, p. 62. In the purposiveness of utility we judge of effect, in a relation of cause to effect, «as a means toward the purposive employment of other causes», while in the internal (inner) purposiveness we judge of effect «as a purpose». (Ibid. § 63, p. 213). See also what Kant says about efficient cause (*nexus effectivus*) and final cause (*nexus finalis*) (Ibid. § 61, p. 206 and § 65, p. 219).

eral two kinds of perfection: *qualitative* and *quantitative*. *Qualitative* (formal) perfection is «the agreement of the manifold in it with the concept [of *what sort of thing it is to be*] (which furnishes the rule for combining the manifold)». *Quantitative* (material) perfection is «the completeness of the thing after its kind, which is a mere concept of magnitude (of totality). In this *what the thing ought to be* is conceived as already determined, and it is only asked if it has *all its requisites*»³.

Perfection, therefore, as a definite purpose is this kind, the *quantitative* perfection, which belongs really to the objective purposiveness. The other kind, the *qualitative* perfection, belongs rather to the subjective purposiveness. Of this Kant says the following: «The formal [element] in the representation of a thing, i.e. the agreement of the manifold with a unity (it being undetermined what this ought to be), gives to cognition no objective purposiveness whatever. For since abstraction is made of this unity as *purpose* (what the thing ought to be), nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of the representations in the mind of the intuiting subject. And this, although it furnishes a certain purposiveness of the representative state of the subject, and so a facility of apprehending a given form by the imagination, yet furnishes no perfection of an object, since the object is not here conceived by means of the concept of a purpose»⁴.

It is obvious, then, from the above passage, that perfection as a purpose does not belong to the subjective purposiveness which is without purpose, but to the objective purposiveness which «can only be cognized by means of the reference of the manifold to a definite purpose, and therefore only through a concept»⁵. From this alone it is plain that the judgment of taste as an aesthetical judgment which rests on subjective grounds, the determining ground of which cannot be a concept, and consequently cannot be the concept of a definite purpose, is independent of the concept of perfection. «Therefore by means of beauty, regarded as a formal subjective purposiveness, there is no way thought a perfection of the object»⁶. The beauty is not the same as perfection.

3. Ibid. § 15, p. 63; see also Preface to the *Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* (passage quoted by Bernard in the *Critique of Judgment*, p. 63n.).

4. *Critique of Judgment* § 15, pp. 63-64.

5. Ibid. § 15, p. 62.

6. Ibid. § 15, p. 64.

2. Kant Contrasted to Baumgarten

Kant's separation of beauty from perfection contrasts to Baumgarten's definition of beauty as «perfection apprehended through the senses»⁷. Baumgarten (1714-1762) who invented the term aesthetics and wrote the first book called *Aesthetica*⁸, published in 1750, «developed in all its ramifications the hallowed Leibniz-Wolff doctrine of the beautiful as perfection apprehended through the senses, that is, as the perfection of confused cognition as such — *perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis*»⁹. In his *Meditationes Philosophicae de Nonnullis ad Poema Pertinentibus*, where he examines beauty with particular reference to the art of poetry, he says in § 9 that «by poem we mean a perfect sensate discourse»¹⁰ (*Oratio sensitua perfecte est POEMA*)¹¹. And in § 115 he defines «philosophical poetics» as «the science guiding sensate discourse to perfection»¹² (*Philosophia poetica est scientia ad perfectionem dirigens orationem sensitivam*)¹³. In the *Aesthetica* § 14 he gives again as purpose of the new science the «perfection of sensate cognition»¹⁴.

Commenting on the above paragraphs, B. Croce says the following about Aesthetic as a new and independent science in Baumgarten: «It gives the norm of sensitive cognition (*sensitive quid cognoscendi*) and deals with '*perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis*', which is beauty (*pulchritudo*), just as the opposite, imperfection, is ugliness (*deformitas*)»¹⁵.

3. Separation of the Beautiful from the Good

In opposition to Baumgarten, Kant, as we said, accepts that the beautiful is quite independent of the perfection, as also of the good. Es-

7. See *ibid.*, p. 63n.

8. Baumgarten defined the science of aesthetic as *scientia cognitionis sensitivae, theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulchre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis* (The science of sensuous cognition, the theory of the fine arts, the theory of the inferior kind of knowledge, the art of thinking beautifully, the art of analogical reasoning).

9. I. Knox, *The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer*, p. 4.

10. A. G. Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*; tr. by Karl Aschenbrenner and W. B. Holther, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954, p. 39.

11. See the original text at the end of the above book, p. 7.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

13. Original text, *ibid.*, p. 39.

14. I take this quotation from translator's introduction to the above book, p. 5.

15. B. Croce, *Aesthetic*, p. 213.

pecially of the relation between the beautiful and the good he says the following: «The beautiful, the judging of which has at its basis a merely formal purposiveness, i.e. a purposiveness without purpose, is quite independent of the concept of the good»¹⁶. «Thus to distinguish between the concepts of the beautiful and the good as if they were only different in logical form, the first being a confused, the second a clear concept of perfection, but identical in content and origin, is quite fallacious»¹⁷.

The reason of this difference between the beautiful and the good, as Kant explains in the section about the first moment, is because «in order to find anything good, I must always know what sort of a thing the object ought to be, i.e. I must have a concept of it. But there is no need of this to find a thing beautiful»¹⁸. Another difference is also that «in the case of the good, the question always is whether it is mediately or immediately good (useful or good in itself); but on the contrary in the case of the pleasant, there can be no question about this at all, for the word always signifies something which pleases immediately (The same is applicable to what I call beautiful)»¹⁹. The good has a reference to the faculty of desire, and brings with it a pure practical satisfaction which is determined by the existence of the object. On the other hand, the judgment of taste is merely *contemplative*; i.e., it is a judgment which is indifferent as regards the existence of an object²⁰. So, the beautiful in general is different from the good because it does not serve, like the good, an immediate purpose; it does not arouse a desire to consume or use it.

B. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FREE AND DEPENDENT BEAUTY (Dependence of Beauty on Goodness)

1. Free and Dependent Beauty

Though in Kant art or the beautiful «is not good or useful either», his view, on the other hand, «does not preclude the moral significance of art»²¹. So, in a further examination of the relation of the beautiful to the

16. *Critique of Judgment* § 15, p. 62.

17. *Ibid.* § 15, p. 64.

18. *Ibid.* § 4, p. 41.

19. *Ibid.* § 4, p. 42.

20. *Ibid.* § 5, pp. 43-44.

21. René Wellek, «Aesthetics and Criticism» in *The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern Times*, p. 69.

good he talks about a combination of these two, by which the beautiful becomes dependent on the good. Therefore, since the question now arises about a dependent beauty, this kind of beauty must be understood, of course, in a different sense from that which Kant gave before when he characterized the beautiful as independent.

Kant distinguishes «two kinds of beauty: free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*), or merely dependent beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). The first presuppose no concept of what the object ought to be; the second does presupposes such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance therewith. The first is called the (self-subsistent) beauty of this or that thing; the second, as dependent upon a concept (conditional beauty), is ascribed to objects which come under the concept of a particular purpose»²². Examples of the first kind of beauty are the flowers (free natural beauties)²³, e.g. a tulip which, as Kant explains, «is regarded as beautiful, because in perceiving it we find a certain purposiveness which, in our judgment, is referred to no purpose at all»²⁴. Other examples of free beauty are also «many birds (such as the parrot, the humming bird, the bird of paradise) and many sea shells». Musical fantasies must be also reckoned among free beauties²⁵. All these beauties are free because they do not presuppose a concept of a purpose. «But human beauty (i.e. of a man, a woman, or a child), the beauty of a horse, or a building (be it church, palace, arsenal, or summerhouse), presupposes a concept of the purpose which determines what the thing is to be, and consequently a concept of its perfection; it is therefore adherent beauty»²⁶.

2. Kant Compared to Hutcheson

We also find this distinction of beauty between free and dependent in the pages of Francis Hutcheson, Lord Kames, and Moses Mendelssohn. Hutcheson, for example, writes the following in his *Enquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*: «Beauty is either *Original* or *Comparative*; or, if any like the Terms better, *Absolute* or *Relative*... We therefore by *Absolute* Beauty understand only that Beauty

22. *Critique of Judgment* § 26, p. 65.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.* § 17, p. 73n.

25. *Ibid.* § 16, p. 66.

26. *Ibid.*

which we perceive in Object without *comparison* to any thing external, of which the Object is supposed an Imitation, or Picture; such as that Beauty perceived from the *Works of Nature, artificial Forms, Figures, Theorems. Comparative or Relative Beauty* is that which we perceive in Objects, commonly considered as *Imitations or Resemblances* of something else»²⁷.

It is evident, then, from the above passage that what Hutcheson calls *original* or *absolute* beauty corresponds to that beauty which is characterized by Kant as «free». And what Hutcheson calls *comparative* or *relative* beauty corresponds to that which is characterized by Kant as «dependent».

3. The Combination of the Beautiful with the Good

In Kant's distinction between free and dependent beauty we can understand that in so far as the judgment of taste in respect of the beauty of a thing is independent of the purpose in its manifold, we judge of the object as free beauty. But, in so far as the judgment of taste is made dependent on the purpose, we consider the object as an adherent beauty, that is, beauty dependent on a definite purpose, such as perfection or good. It is the latter case, then, in which the combination of the beautiful with the good takes place. Kant says: «As the combination of the pleasant (in sensation) with beauty, which properly is only concerned with form, is a hindrance to the purity of the judgment of taste, so also is its purity injured by the combination with beauty of the good (viz. that manifold which is good for the thing itself in accordance with its purpose)»²⁸. But if, on the other hand, «the judgment of taste in respect of the beauty of a thing is made dependent on the purpose in its mani-

27. Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, Section I, XVII. «This division of *Beauty*», as Hutcheson explains in a footnote on this paragraph, «is taken from the different *Foundations* of Pleasure to our sense of it, rather than from the Objects themselves... But we may distinctly consider these two *Fountains* of Pleasure, *Uniformity* in the Object self, and *Resemblance* of some Original» (See *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*; In Two Treatises: I. Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design, and II. Concerning Moral Good and Evil, Printed for I. Darby, etc., London 1726, pp. 14-15; as for the footnote, see p. 15).

28. *Critique of Judgment* § 16, p. 66.

fold, like a judgment of reason, and thus limited, it is no longer a free and pure judgment of taste»²⁹.

In this case, therefore, in which the judgment of taste in view of a purpose ceases to be a free and pure judgment of taste, we have a «combination of aesthetical with intellectual satisfaction», a «unification of taste with reason, i.e. of the beautiful with the good, by which the former becomes available as an instrument of design in respect of the latter... Properly speaking, however, perfection gains nothing by beauty, or beauty by perfection; but when we compare the representation by which an object is given to us with the object (as regards what it ought to be) by means of a concept, we cannot avoid considering along with it the sensation in the subject. And thus when both states of mind are in harmony our *whole faculty* of representative power gains»³⁰.

C. THE IDEAL OF BEAUTY

(Beauty as the Symbol of Morality)

1. Distinction between «Idea» and «Ideal» (Definition of the Ideal of Beauty)

Since the combination of the beautiful with the good is based on a definite purpose, on the concept of what the object ought to be, we can understand that this combination falls on the grounds of objective purposiveness which, according to Kant, «can only be cognized by means of the reference of the manifold to a definite purpose, and therefore only through a concept»³¹. It is on the same grounds, the grounds of objective purposiveness, that the ideal of beauty falls, too. «The beauty for which an ideal is to be sought cannot be *vague* beauty, but is *fixed* by a concept of objective purposiveness»³².

In his discussion of the «Ideal of Beauty» (in the last paragraph of the section about the third moment of the judgment of taste) Kant distinguishes at first *ideal* from *idea*. «*Idea* properly means a rational concept»³³. «The highest model», for example, «the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, which everyone must produce in himself and according to

29. Ibid. § 16, p. 67.

30. Ibid. § 16, p. 67.

31. Ibid. § 15, p. 62.

32. Ibid. § 17, p. 69.

33. Ibid. § 17, p. 69.

which he must judge every object of taste, every example of judgment by taste, and even the taste of everyone»³⁴. On the other hand, *ideal* means «the representation of an individual being, regarded as adequate to an idea. Hence that archetype of taste, which certainly rests on the indeterminate idea that reason has of a maximum, but which cannot be represented by concepts but only in an individual presentation, is better called the ideal of the beautiful»³⁵.

2. Man and the Ideal of Beauty

Since, according to the above definition, the ideal of beauty rests on a presentation and not on concepts, it can only be an ideal of the imagination, for imagination is the faculty of presentation. So, the question which Kant brings out here is: «How do we arrive at such an ideal of beauty? *A priori*, or empirically?»

He remarks at first that «the beauty for which an ideal is to be sought cannot be *vague* beauty, but is *fixed* by a concept of objective purposiveness; and it cannot appertain to the object of a quite pure judgment of taste, but to that of a judgment of taste which is in part intellectual. That is, in whatever grounds of judgment an ideal is to be found, an idea of reason in accordance with definite concepts must lie at its basis, which determines *a priori* the purpose on which the internal possibility of the object rests»³⁶.

An ideal, then, is inconceivable of the beautiful flowers, because as free beauties they presuppose no concept of a purpose. Neither can an ideal be represented, for example, by a beautiful dwelling house though this house as a dependent beauty presupposes a definite purpose, but a purpose which is not sufficiently determined and fixed by the concept. Thus Kant concludes that «the only being which has the purpose of its existence in itself is *man*, who can determine his purposes by reason; or, where he must receive them from external perception, yet can compare them with essential and universal purposes and can judge this their accordance aesthetically. This *man* is, then, alone of all objects in the world, susceptible of an ideal of *beauty*, as it is only *humanity* in his person, as an intelligence, that is susceptible of the ideal of *perfection*»³⁷.

34. Ibid. § 17, pp. 68-69.

35. Ibid. § 17, p. 69.

36. Ibid. § 17, p. 69.

37. Ibid. § 17, pp. 69-70.

3. Normal Idea and Rational Idea

In these relations of *man to beauty*, on the one hand, and of *humanity to Perfection*, on the other hand, Kant finds two corresponding elements: «*First*, there is the aesthetical *normal idea*, which is an individual intuition (of the imagination), representing the standard of our judgment [upon man] as a thing belonging to a particular animal species. *Secondly*, there is the *rational idea* which makes the purposes of humanity, so far as they cannot be sensibly represented, the principle for judging of a figure through which, as their phenomenal effect, those purposes are revealed. The normal idea of the figure of an animal of a particular race must take its elements from experience. But the greatest purposiveness in the construction of the figure that would be available for the universal standard of aesthetical judgment upon each individual of this species — the image which is as it were designedly at the basis of nature's technique, to which only the whole race and not any isolated individual is adequate — this lies merely in the idea of the judging [subject]. And this, with its proportions as an aesthetical idea, can be completely presented *in concreto in a model*»³⁸.

4. The Beautiful and the Moral

According to Kant, «we must yet distinguish the *normal idea* of the beautiful from the *ideal*, which latter, on grounds already alleged, we can only expect in the *human* figure. In this the ideal consists in the expression of the *moral*, without which the object would not please universally and thus positively (not merely negatively in an accurate presentation). The visible expression of moral ideas that rule men inwardly can indeed only be gotten from experience; but to make its connection with all which our reason unites with the morally good in the idea of the highest purposiveness—goodness of heart, purity, strength, peace, etc. — visible as it were in bodily manifestation (as the effect of that which is internal) requires a union of pure ideas of reason with great imaginative power even in him who wishes to judge of it, still more in him who wishes to present it. The correctness of such an ideal of beauty is shown by its permitting no sensible charm to mingle with the satisfaction in the object, and yet allowing us to take a great interest therein. This shows that a judgment in accordance with such a standard can

38. Ibid. § 17, p. 70.

never be purely aesthetical, and that a judgment in accordance with an ideal of beauty is not a mere judgment of taste»³⁹.

CONCLUSION

(The Relation of Beauty to Goodness and Truth)

The general conclusion of Kant as concerns the determination of the beautiful according to the third moment is that «*beauty* is the form of the *purposiveness* of an object, so far as this is perceived in it *without any representation of a purpose*»¹; or, as Croce expresses this determination, «that is beautiful which has the form of finality without the representation of an end»².

Now, if we would like to make in our own conclusion a comparison of this moment, the third one, with the first and the second moments we could say in general that the first: «That is beautiful which pleases *without interest*» is directed «against sensualism and its reduction of art to pleasure»³. On the other hand, the second moment: «That is beautiful which pleases without concepts» is directed against «intellectualism which defined beauty as the realm of confused concepts, and art as the sensuous—imaginative embodiment of a rational idea»⁴.

In the first moment, where Kant treats the satisfaction in reference to the judgment of taste, the pleasant, and the good, he finds that in the case of the pleasant and the good there is a similarity since the satisfaction in both is bound up with interest; but there is no such a similarity of these two (the pleasant and the good) with the judgment of taste, for its satisfaction is characterized by «disinterestedness». In the second moment, on the other hand, where Kant treats the beautiful in relation to the concept, he finds that the beautiful, as in its relation to the good, is also apart from concepts, that is, from understanding, for the faculty of concepts is the faculty of understanding. Now, if we would try to see the first and the second moment from the point of view of the Platonic triad of the beautiful, the good, and the true, we could find that

39. Ibid. § 17, pp. 72-73.

1. Ibid. § 17, p. 73.

2. B. Croce, *Aesthetic*, p. 280.

3. René Wellec, «Aesthetic and Criticism» in *The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern Times*, p. 68; see also B. Croce, *Aesthetic*, p. 280.

4. Israel Knox, *The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer*, p. 39; see also Croce, *Aesthetic*, p. 280.

the first moment concerns in general the relation of the beautiful to the good⁵, and the second the relation of the beautiful to the true.

In general the Platonic triad impressed, among so many others, Kant, too. A great evidence of this is his *Three Critiques*, which are an illustration of the true, the beautiful, and the good corresponding to the three faculties of the soul: intellect, feeling, and will. The *Critique of Pure Reason* (intellect) concerns the logical truth, the *Critique of Judgment* (feeling) concerns the beautiful, and the *Critique of Practical Reason* (will) concerns the moral good. But, though he finds Judgment (beautiful) as the mediating link between Pure Reason (true) and practical Reason (good), he does not agree with Plato who at the end of the *Philibus* identifies the beautiful, the good, and the true⁶. In opposition to him, Kant accepts the autonomy of Beauty.

This autonomy of Beauty in Kant, that is, the independence of the beautiful from the good and the true is especially the subject of the third moment of the judgment of taste, i.e. of the determination of the beautiful in terms of «purposiveness». Since the beautiful is without definite purpose defined as «the concept of an object»⁷, it is independent from the logical truth. Kant says: «The faculty of concepts, be they confused or clear, is the understanding; and although understanding has to do with the judgment of taste as an aesthetical judgment (as it has with all judgments), yet it has to do with it, not as a faculty by which an object is cognized, but as the faculty which determines the judgment and its representation (without any concept) in accordance with its relation to the subject and the subject's internal feeling, in so far as this judgment may be possible in accordance with a universal rule»⁸.

On the other hand, since the beautiful is without definite purpose defined as «object of a concept»⁹, it is also independent from the good.

5. The first moment, according to Croce, is «against the sensationalists» (*Aesthetic*, p. 280). *Sensationalism* in Ethics is «the doctrine that feeling is the sole criterion of good» (Webster's Dictionary; see also the term *sensualism* in the same dictionary).

6. *The Dialogues of Plato*; tr. by Jowett, Random House, New York, vol. 2, pp. 401, 403. See also Constantine Cavarnos, *Plato's Theory of Fine Art*, «Astir» Publishing Co, Athens, pp. 27-29. We find also this identity in Plotinus and St. Augustine. About these three highest values in general see Gregoris Papamihail, *The Triad of the Highest Values of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good from the Christian Point of View*, Academy of Athens, Athens, 1946 (in Greek).

7. *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction, p. 17

8. *Ibid.* § 15, p. 65; see also Kant's Introduction's VIII, pp. 29, 30.

9. *Ibid.* § 10, p. 55.

Kant says: «The beautiful, the judging of which has at its basis a merely formal purposiveness, i.e. a purposiveness without purpose, is quite independent of the concept of the good, because the latter presupposes an objective purposiveness, i.e. the reference of the object to a definite purpose»¹⁰.

This independence of the beautiful from the good and the true makes René Wellek say that «Kant must be considered the first philosopher who clearly and definitely established the peculiarity and autonomy of the aesthetic realm»¹¹. «Only in Kant do we find an elaborate argument that the aesthetic realm differs from the realm of morality, utility, and science because the aesthetic state of mind differs profoundly from our perception of the pleasurable, the moving, the useful, the true, and the good»¹². «The idea of the autonomy of art was almost immediately taken up by Kant's first distinguished pupil in aesthetics, the poet Schiller. Schiller resolutely embraces Kant's doctrine of the distinctness and apartness of the aesthetic realm. In some of his formulations he seems to come near to that idea of art for art's sake of which he has been claimed one of the main progenitors»¹³. «This term [of «art-for-art's-sake»] was used, apparently for the first time, by Venjamin Constant with reference to Kant's aesthetics in his *Intimate Diary* in 1804»¹⁴.

But, though Kant accepts the autonomy of Beauty, he does not preclude the moral significance of art. So, towards the end of his treatment of the third moment he finds that by «the unification of taste with reason, i.e. of the beautiful with the good» «our whole faculty of representative power gains»¹⁵. This unification is especially the case with Kant in his treatment of the «Analytic of the Sublime» where, according to J. H. Bernard, «the connection between beauty and goodness, involved to a Greek in the double sense of the word *καλόν*, is developed by Kant with keen insight»¹⁶. The general conclusion of the first part of

10. *Ibid.* § 15, p. 62.

11. René Wellek, «Aesthetics and Criticism» in *The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World*, p. 67.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 68; see also pp. 69, 78, 87.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 80. Among those who stood against the opinion «ars gratia artis», was Tolstoy, too. He accepts not «art for art's sake» but «art for man's sake» (Leo Tolstoy, *What Is Art?* A Hesperides Book, New York, 1962, ch. V, p. 120 and ch. XX, p. 288). As is known, Tolstoy's opinion about art forms also the main idea of Ptusko's marvellous Russian moving picture «Stone Flower».

15. *Critique of Judgment* § 16, p. 67.

16. *Ibid.*, p. XX (Translator's Introduction).

the *Critique of Judgment* is that «the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good»¹⁷.

INSTEAD OF EPILOGUE
(Back to Narcissus' Legend)

Now I come back to the legend of Narcissus with which I began and with which I would like also to finish. The emphasis of this legend is on the extraordinary beauty of Narcissus. It is this beauty that makes him fall in love with himself. This kind of beauty of a man, according to Kant, as we said, is a dependent beauty in opposition to that of Narcissus' flower which, like every other flower, is a free beauty. The human beauty is dependent because it presupposes the concept of a particular purpose, the concept of what the object ought to be. The purpose, therefore, is the perfection of the object¹.

Now, «the only being», according to Kant, «which has the purpose of its existence in itself is *man*, who can determine his purpose by reason»². «This *man* is, then, alone of all objects in the world, susceptible of an ideal of *beauty*, as it is only *humanity* in his person, as an intelligence, that is susceptible of the ideal of *perfection*»³. For this reason, «we can only expect [the *ideal*] in the human figure. In this the ideal consists in the expression of the *moral*»⁴, «the morally good in the idea of the highest purposiveness—goodness of heart, purity, strength, peace, etc.—visible as it were in bodily manifestation (as the effect of that which is internal)»⁵. «In such a case, e.g.», according to Kant, «if it is said 'That is a beautiful woman', we think nothing else than this: nature represents in her figure the purposes in view in the shape of a woman's figure. For we must look beyond the mere form to a concept, if the object is to be thought in such a way by means of a logically conditioned aesthetical judgment»⁶. By this means is formed the ideal of beauty in the human face, the expression of moral life⁷. In this sense, therefore, as Kant points

17. *Ibid.* § 59, p. 198; see also the whole paragraph, § 59, entitled: «Of Beauty as the Symbol of Morality».

1. *Critique of Judgment* § 16, p. 65; see also § 48, p. 154.

2. *Ibid.* § 17, p. 69.

3. *Ibid.* § 17, p. 70.

4. *Ibid.* § 17, p. 72.

5. *Ibid.* § 17, p. 72.

6. *Ibid.* § 48, p. 154.

7. B. Croce, *Aesthetic*, p. 277.

out, «the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good»⁸. This is especially the case with Narcissus whose beauty, on which the emphasis of the legend is put, is a symbol of the morally good: the beauty of his soul.

Narcissus is a fable and it is not allowed to interpret this fable literally. Like every other fable, the fable of Narcissus, too, has a symbolism. Narcissus lives in the idyllic and beautiful nature of Boeotia (of Greece) which is as beautiful as he is. The beauty of nature reflects his own beauty. So, seeing the beautiful nature, Narcissus becomes conscious of another beauty. But, what kind of beauty? In the pool where Narcissus goes, it is the complete silence and transparency of this pool that attracts him, for, as the poet says:

«...Here Narcissus, tired
Of hunting and the heated noon, lay down,
Attracted by the peaceful solitudes»⁹.

In such a lonely place, then, with the help of the silence of Nature he looks and discovers a world within himself more beautiful than the world which surrounded him. So, when he stoops in the still and quiet pool, what he sees there it is not his face and his body.

It is his soul!...

Here is, therefore, the power of beauty which attracted the love of Narcissus: the *soul* and not the *flesh*. With such meaning, the spiritual meaning, Plotinus, the greatest philosophical mystic, «in his disputation *περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ* (Of the Good) introduces it [the myth of Narcissus] in illustration of his argument, that the soul must penetrate through the outward to discover the inward beauty»¹⁰.

In this sense, therefore, Narcissus' legend applies to Kant's characterization of «the beautiful as the symbol of the morally good»¹¹.

8. *Critique of Judgment* § 59, p. 198.

9. Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Bk. III, vol I., p. 107.

10. Thomas Edwards, *Cephalus and Procris. Narcissus*; ed. by W. E. Buckley, Nichols and Sons, London, 1882, p. 274. See also the relative passage from Plotinus *Enneads* i. vi, 8 which Edwards quotes on the same page.

11. *Critique of Judgment* § 59, p. 198.