MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION*

Educational Implications of the Early Greek Patristic Anthropology and their Relation to Modern Theories of Moral Education.

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CHAPTER IV

THEORY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION

In discussing in the previous chapter the means by which the restoration of fallen man takes place, it has been pointed out that according to Macarius this is realized through the divine power on the condition that man co-operates with it as much as it is possible for him. It has also been pointed out that human effort can improve the moral side of man's personality (cf. XV. 42, p. 232, 24 f). The process of this improvement is often called by Christian writers ἀγωγὴ or παιδαγωγία, meaning discipline and preparation training respectively.

In this chapter we intend to present and discuss Macarius' views on the following issues:

I. The aim of education.
II. The possibility and limitations of education and factors influencing man's (moral) development.
III. The qualifications and the role of the educator.

In addition we will indicate the types of school he refers to and his attitude to classical culture.

Macarius, like most Christian writers,[1] never treats the questions set above systematically. His views regarding these questions are scattered throughout his writings. Therefore, it is necessary to search for, systematize and analyze them, in order to form a general picture of his theoretical system.

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* Συνέχεια ἐκ τῆς σελ. 389 τοῦ προηγουμένου τεύχους.

1. In the early patristic literature the following works are of special interest to the student of the history of education: Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus*; Basil, *Address to Young Men*; Gregory of Nyssa, *Great Catechetical Sermon*; Chrysostom, *On Vainglory and the Right Way for Parents to Bring Up their Children*; Gregory Nazianzen. *Eulogy for Basil the Great;* Jerome, *Letters to Laeta and Gaudentius*, and Augustine, *The Teacher*.

I. *The Aim of Education*

Throughout human history man has hoped to achieve different aims through education. These aims were determined by the level of civilization and the historical circumstances each society lived under. In the Hellenic world the oldest ideal of education we can trace is the Homeric one, which is known as the «heroic ideal» and was personified by Achilles, the brave fighter and the persuasive rhetor.[2] Later, when new political and social conditions prevailed in the Greek world, the educational ideal changed. The new ideal became known as the «agricultural ideal»and was expressed by Hesiod.[3] In the sixth century B.C. and forward, wealth and nobility of soul were thought to be the high aims of life. Theognis (550-500 B.C.) and Pindar (522-442 B.C.) praised them and argued that nobility of soul is an inborn quality of a person.[4] In the Persian wars, however, deeds of excellency were accomplished not only by members of the nobility but by others of lower social levels. Therefore, it was recognized that what is important is not the origin of a person but the development of his personality.[5] Thus, studying and the acquisition of *sophia* prevailed as the educational ideal. The Sophists stood for the political *sophia*, while Socrates stood for the ethical *sophia.*[6] This ideal resulted in the development of individualistic tendencies, which in the fourth century were opposed by another ideal, according to which the aim of education was to enable the individual to direct society in such a way that the greatest good for mankind is produced. The latter view was held by Plato (420-348 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.),[7] who expected education to make each man a perfect citi-

2. Homer, *Iliad*, I. 442: διδασκέμεναι τάδε πάντα, μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμμεναι πρηκτῆρα τε ἔργων.

3. A. Danases, *Op. cit.*, p. 87. For a comprehensive review of educational ideas of the past see pp. 83-127.

4. Theognis, *Eleg.* 437-48 and 537-38; Pindar, *Olymp.* II. 94.

5. A Danases, *Op. Cit.*, p. 92.

6. C. Spetsieres, *Theoria Paideias*, p. 24 f.

7. P. Monroe, *A Textbook in the History of Education*, p. 148; A. H. Armstrong, *Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*, p. 112. P. Monroe, however, makes clear that, though Plato and Aristotle agreed on the question of the aim of education, they offered different solutions to the issue of formulation of the aim of education. Plato found the solution in the gradual acquirement of ideas that possessed independent existence. This possession in the individual constituted virtue. Aristotle, however, discriminated between the intellectual and the volitional activities of the mind and argued that virtue consisted not in knowledge but in a state of will, which is not so much a condition as it is a process; see p. 148 f.

zen understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously.[8] Christianity, finally, attempted a combination of the socially oriented education and individualistic education.

In the following we intend to give a description of Macarius' views on education, as this relates to his general understanding of human life. The latter is seen by Macarius as a single unity which, one might say, develops at the following levels:

I. The physical level, which includes all the biological functions of man. These form that part of man which he shares with animals.

II. The intellectual level, which includes all the activities of the mind.

III. The moral level which mainly includes man's conduct with other members of the human community and, moreover, that part of man's inner life which experiences a conflict between the desire to do what man believes he ought to do and the desire to do something else appealing to him.

IV. The spiritual level which is the highest of the four and relates to man's ability to participate in the divine life.

Education, as it is understood by the early Christian writers, should mainly focus its concern on the development of the moral faculty. The latter is often thought to depend partly on man's intellectual abilities and is always related by Christians to one's spiritual life. In terms of importance these levels come in an ascending order as they are given above. In the previous chapter we have dealt with the spiritual level under the concepts of vision and deification.

The actual term Macarius uses to denote education is παδαγωγία which patristic literature defines as ἀγωγὴν (=guiding ἀγαθὴν ἐκ παίδων πρὸς ἀρετήν.)[9] Children and the beginners in the Christian vocation, writes Macarius, need a lot of παιδαγωγία, just as a growing plant needs a lot of care and attention, until it is well rooted and can withstand even the most severe weather conditions (*Neue Hom.* I, 1, vol. 42, p. 36. 8f). The development of the moral faculty of man, as we have seen, depends mainly upon the free will (αὐτεξούσιον or προαίρεσις of the

8. Plato, *Laws*, A. 643E: πολιτῶν γενέσθαι τέλειον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης.

9. Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus* I. 5, ST. I. P. 96, 24. In Lampe's *Patristic Lexicon* παιδαγωγία is said to mean «elementary training» see p. 995 B.

individual (*Ibid.*, p. 36,7). Therefore, not all members of a monastic community develop towards the same directions, just as the students of a school develop differently and some become undisciplined, some licentious, some theater actors, while others become scholastics and court officers (*Ibid.*, p. 36, 5f).[10] The main aim of a school is to make its students scholastics, i.e., to give them a general education, which involves the develpment of their intellect. This corresponds to the second of the four levels mentioned above, which is usually of secondary interest to ascetics. However, to the surprise of the modern reader, Macarius seems to base moral development not only on man's free will, but also on the intellectual faculty of man. Macarius is not in favour of obscurantism and declares that man has not only the ability but has also the responsibility to understand first the matter of his faith and then to devote himself with all his power to the practice of it: Προείπομεν ὅτι τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἔχει ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ ταύτην ὁ Θεὸς ἐπιζητεῖ. Παραγγέλλει οὖν, ἵνα πρῶτον νοήσῃ καὶ νοήσας ἀγαπήσῃ καὶ θελήματι ἐπιτηδεύσῃ (XXXXVII, 10. p. 319. 8f).

In the moral life the role of the intellect is to distinguish good from evil, and point out the proper way of conduct; however, it is up to man's will, as we have seen, to decide what to embrace. Macarius writes:

> Πρὸ πάντων τοῦ διανοητικοῦ καὶ διακριτικοῦ μέλους τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν πάσῃ δυνάμει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὀφείλουσιν, ἵνα τὴν διάκρισιν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ἐν ἀκριβείᾳ κτησάμενοι καὶ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν εἰσαχθέντα πάθη τῇ καθαρᾷ φύσει πάντοτε διακρίνοντες, εὐθέτως καὶ ἀπροσκόπτως πολιτευσώμεθα, ἵνα ὡς ὀφθαλμῷ τῷ τῆς διακρίσεως μέλει χρώμεθα, ἀσυνδύαστοι καὶ ἀσύνθετοι πρὸς τὰς τῆς κακίας ὑποθέσεις εἶναι δυνηθῶμεν, καὶ οὕτω τῆς θείας δωρεᾶς καταξιωθέντες, ἄξιοι τοῦ Κυρίου γενώμεθα (IV, 1, p. 158, 17 f).

The importance of moral reasoning for the development of a moral personality has been lately emphasized by different schools in the field of moral education.[11] One of them directly liniks man's development

10. Macarius uses the Latin term *exceptor* which means a short hand writer: a scribe, and in his time it meant also an officer in the court of chancery; see Ch. Lewis, *A Latin Dictionary*, p. 676. Macarius seems to use the term with this meaning.

11. H. Kirschenbaum, «Clarifying Values Clarification; Some Theoretical Issues», in D. Purpel, *Moral Education*, p. 120. The most important of these theories are the cognitive-developmental theory and the cognitive theory; see M. Scriven, «Cognitive Moral Education», in D. Purpel, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 314f and 323f. However

to his capacity to advance moral reasoning to higher levels. This theory is known as «the cognitive-develpmental approach to moral education»; (the latter moves within the Greco-Christian tradition, which holds that there is something moving in man, some dynamic which pushes him towards a higher level of existence).[12] The major exponents of this theory are J. Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. An outline of the latter's theory is presented below; here we will just mention that Macarius' notion that the discernment between good and evil is not easy, but presupposes the cultivation of man's intellect; it is very close to the theory of Kohlberg, which calls for a continuous discussion on a series of moral dilemmas for the development of one's reasoning. Such discussions develop man's ability to apply rightly his moral principles to given cases.[13]

However, it should be pointed out that between Macarius and Kohlberg there exists a basic difference in the way they evaluate the role of reason in moral behavior. Unlike Kohlberg, Macarius distinguishes sharply between moral reasoning and moral action, which really shows the state of moral development. Moral reasoning involves a cognitive component, but in Macarius' thought moral behavior is not just a cognitive matter, as Kohlberg seems to think.[14] For Macarius free will, old habits, emotions, passions etc. play their role in man's moral development, as we have seen. L. Kohlberg, however, argues that moral judgment is the most important factor found in moral behavior; unlike will and the other secondary factors which are morally neutral, moral judgment, argues Kohlberg, is the one *moral* factor in moral behavior. Finally, explaining the heavy role the cognitive developmental approach attributes to reason, Kohlberg claims that a high stage moral reason is never lost, and it always influences man's moral behavior; the correlation found between moral judgment and moral action is high.[15]

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both developmentalists and cognivists realize that reason is by no means the sole factor in moral development; see M. Scriven, *Op. Cit.*, and D. W. Oliver, «Moral Education: Is Reasoning Enough?» in D. Purpel, *Op. Cit.*, p. 359 f.

12. D. Purpel, *Moral Education*, p. 173.

13. C. Beck, *Moral Education in the Schools*, p. 21 f.

14. L. Kohlberg, «Stages of Moral Develompent as a Basis for Moral Education», in C. M. Beck, *Moral Education; Interdisciplinary Approaches*, p. 44. More about this is found in chapter V.

15. Kohlberg, «The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education», in P. Scharf, *Readings in Moral Education*, p. 39 f.

What contemporary scholarship calls *moral, judgment* is called by Macarius, and other Christian writers, διάκρισις, meaning discernment (IV. I, p. 158,17 f). The concept of discernment acquired a central position in Christian thought, especially in the ascetic tradition, and it was thought to be the queen of all virtues.[16]

W. Jaeger[17] claims that Gregory of Nyssa equates discernment (διάκρισις) with Plato's prudence (φρόνησις), which in his *Republic* Plato[18] declares to be the only knowledge worth possessing; prudence, argues Plato, enables man to discern the good from the evil and to choose the good. It seems, however, that Jaeger's remark on the way Gregory of Nyssa understands discernment cannot be claimed for Macarius. He uses both terms, i. e., discernment and prudence, but more significantly he includes both of them among the original virtues which constitute God's image in man (XLVI. 5, p. 341, 7f).[19] The Macarian concept of prudence seems to be close to the Platonic one, since it includes both the ability to discern good from evil and the ability to choose the former (cf. IV. 7, p. 161, 8 f). In the writings of Macarius discernment denotes the ability to form superior judgments (cf. *Neue Hom.* I, 1, vol. 42, p. 35,7; *De Elev. Mentis.* 13, vol. 42, p. 220,4 f) rather than a kind of knowledge. Discernment, being an ability, needs to be improved by training and exercising the senses of the soul; these, like everything else of the original nature of man, have been weakened by sin after the fall, and would certainly function better in the discerning task after such a training (cf. *Ep. Magna.* 19, vol. 42, p. 159,12 f). Macarius, however, associates discernment with knowledge, since it requires some knowledge concerning man's moral status; this knowledge, claims Macarius, not only makes the role of discernment easy but it also improves greatly man's potentiality for moral conduct (XXXI. 6, p. 394, 36f), a view which has been proved true by modern research in the field of human behavior.[20] Discernment, moreover, Macarius adds, brings

16. Sophronius of Jerusalem, *Sermo de Nativitate*, ed. H. *Usener*, p. 513. In his *De Octo Virtiosis Cognitationibus* Nilus writes: Πηγὴ καὶ ρίζα καὶ κεφαλὴ καὶ σύνδεσμος πάσης ἀρετῆς ἐστιν ἡ διάκρισις; see PG. 87, 2909 D.

17. W. Jaeger, *Two Rediscovered Works*, pp. 76-77.

18. *Republic.* 618 BC, see also W. Jaeger, *Loc..Cit.*,

19. In his *Gnostica Capita* Diadochus of Photice argues that it is impossible for a man to lose his discernment to such an extent that he would confuse good with evil. This indicates that Diadochus also acknowledges discernment to be a natural property of man. (cf. XII. 9, p. 208, 26-40).

20. N. J. Bull, *Moral Education*, p. 124.

about a superior kind of knowledge which may prove decisive for man's future conduct (cf. *Neue Hom.* V. 1, vol. 42, p. 47,13 f) *Neue Hom.* XI. 1, vol. 42, p. 71,4 f; *Ep. Magna.* 26, vol. 42, p. 164,21 f). Lack of discernment makes a person unskilled (ἰδιώτης) and unfitted for spiritual progress (*Neue Hom.* II. 2, vol. 42, p. 71,30 f; XVII. 5, p. 244,34 f). The possession of it, however, does not necessarily imply that the person would choose good before evil; discernment, unlike prudence, constitutes a necessary but not a sufficient condition for such a choice. The latter requires both discernment and prudence (XVII. 5, p. 244,36f; *De Elev. Mentis.* 13, vol. 42, p. 220,4f). A person should first acquire discernment and then combine it with his natural tendency towards virtue (XXXI. 6, p. 304, 36f).

Another term which Macarius uses for discernment is διακριτικὸν (*Neue Hom.* XI. 1, vol. 42, p. 71,4), though the latter usually denotes the faculty of discernment, which Macarius includes among the members of the soul (IV. 1 and 4, pp. 158,17 and 159,32). A basic function of this faculty is to discern man's thoughts and determine their origin and nature (XXXI. 6, p. 304,36f; *De Elev. Mentis.* 13, vol. 42, p. 193, 16f); this is very important to Macarius, and he regards it superior to all other types of ascesis (cf. *Ep. Magna.* 19, vol. 42, p. 159,13f), as is shown below. Moreover, another task of the faculty of discernment is to distinguish the attacks of the crafty devil (*De Patientia et Discretione.* 12, vol. 42, p. 206,26f) and determine the right usage of *sophia* (cf. XVI. 9, p. 240,25f). The person who possesses the ability for such a task is called by Macarius διακριτικὸς (XXXVI. 1, p. 272,27).

The task of discernment is not an easy one; therefore, Macarius argues that man should be continuously sober and on the alert, this state of watchfulness is called by Macarius and other Fathers νῆψις meaning sobermindedness, or temperance (cf. XVI. 9, p. 240,25; IV. 2 and 3, pp. 158,38 and 159,16; V. 6, p. 180,10).

In Macarius' system man's intellectual development is not an aim in intself, but it is an efficient means to and, moreover, a necessary condition for his moral development. The latter is in the centre of Macarius' educational interests and of Christian training in general, which should endeavour to prepare man for all virtues (*Ep. Magna.* 16, vol. 42, p. 156,36f). All things, writes Macarius to the heads of monastic communities, should be done in the hope that those under your discipline and training will be found fit for the heavenly kingdom (*Ibid.*, p. 157,5 f). The kingdom of heaven is a synonymous term with contem-

plation or vision (θεωρία) and deification (θέωσις).[21] When the latter takes place man has reached the last of the four levels mentioned above,

Thus, moral progress is closely linked with man's final goal, since it constitutes the preceding stage. Similar views have also been expressed by Plotinus, who links man's moral progress with the attainment of the intuitive, contemplative knowledge which finally leads to the highest stage of vision and union.[22]

In contemporary thought morality is again seen not as an end in itself, but as a means towards further ends. Therefore, it is often argued that it is a major achievement in moral education to help a student to see that morality has ends beyond itself, among which happiness is a main one.[23] Such a view, however, is in opposition with the traditional understanding of morality, according to which it is of the essence of morality to be pursued for its own sake. This view has a long tradition, since in the past morality has usually been thought to emanate from the divine will; the divine being was both the lawgiver and the guardian of moral order.[24] Macarius and all the Christians adhere to some extent to this tradition; he, however, is not what modern scholarship calls a conformist who is interested in maintaining the moral order for its own sake;[25] In other words, he is not a sterile moralist, but gives a spiritual dimension in morality. Thus, both Macarius and contemporary thinkers of non-religious orientation share the view that morality has ends beyond itself. This similarity, however, is an external one, since we are dealing here with two completely different systems of morality. Macarius' own system can be called *theistic* in origin and *purgative* in function, while the morality the majority of contemporary educators have in mind is *rational* in origin and *social* in function. These labels need some explanation. By theistic we mean that the values of Christian morality are mainly founded on the divine law, as we pointed out before, and therefore, they are thought to be of universal application. By purgative we mean that the main function of morality, as understood by Macarius,

21. J. Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Chr. Thought*, pp. 124 and 126.

22. A. H. Armstrong, «Plotinus» in his *Cambridge History*, p. 228; cf. *Enn.* VI. 7:36.

23. C. Beck, *Moral Education in the Schools*, p. 27. This reminds one of Aristotle's view on *eudemonia* which he regards as the end of man's virtious life see. A. H. Armstrong, *Introduction to Ancient philosophy*, p. llf; also below p. 2.

24. E. Durkheim, *Moral Education*, pp. 6f, 8f and 19 f.

25. C. Beck. *Loc. Cit.*,

is to purify human nature and restore it to its original state. This, however, does not mean that Macarius' morality is like some pre-Christian religious moralities which were basically concerned with the duties of man toward the gods and overlooked his duties toward the other men. Even the Greek morality was of this kind and, therefore, considered murder to occupy a much lower place in the scale of crimes than impiety.[26] Macarius moves within the limits of the Christian morality which, by teaching that the principal duty of man towards God is to love his neighbor, acquires a social character (cf. VIII. 6, p 191, 24f; XVIII. 8, 251, 25f). The emphasis, however, of the Macarian morality is on the purgative function of morality, whose ultimate goal as we have seen, is to enable man to participate again in the divine life; of the hierarchy of ten virtues given by Macarius (XL. 1, p. 25f), which we discuss below, only service (διακονία) is of purely social function; the other nine discribe mainly the God-man relation or man's duties toward God. Some of them can be taken to refer to both kinds of human duties, i.e., toward the divine and toward man, but, as we see from the way Macarius uses the term love, which can be applied to both God and man, one can claim that Macarius uses them mainly in reference to man's duties to God.

The secular morality was called rationalistic or humanistic, because it derives its values not from a revealed religion, but rests exclusively on ideas, sentiments, and practices, which are thought to be definable by reason.[27] The main interest of this type of morality is to serve the well being of all people, by securing a just and caring community.[28] Religious beliefs, such as the belief in the life after death, give a new dimension to the world of the believer and, moreover, add to the believer's moral hierarchy values not found in the non-religious moral systems.

Some modern Christians adopt a very humanistic approach to morality and argue that a believer can live without using God as a working hypothesis.[29] This, however, is not the spirit of Macarius and the other early Christian writers.

Concerning the scope of Christian training, Macarius is in agreement with the general early Christian tradition, which saw the whole

26. E. Durkheim, *Op. Cit.*, p. 6 f.
27. E. Durkheim, *Op. Cit.*, p. 3.
28. J. Watt, *Rational Moral Education*, p. 15 f.
29. D. Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from the Prison*, p. 164.

Christian community as a school aiming at training up its members to a virtuous rather than an intellectual life.[30] He shares with the other Christian Fathers the view that virtue can be taught, though the way which leads to it is both lifelong and difficult, as we have seen before (cf. XVII. 6, p. 244,39f). God has created man prone to virtue (*Seven Hom.* IV. 4, vol. 42, p. 37,30f), but left to the free will of man the choice of making this proneness reality or following the opposite way (XXVII. 10-11, pp. 286,19—287,10). Thus, man has to learn to choose virtue, which is attained through teaching[31] and discipline (ἄσκησις) (XXVII. 20, p. 290,30f; IV. 16, p. 165,5f; XV. 42, p. 232,24 f; XIX. 5, p. 255,9f). These two means are provided by education. Therefore, one may say that Macarius believes that virtue can be taught; for him man is an «animal educandum». More about the factors and the means of education follow in this and in the next chapter.

II. *The Possibility and Limitations of Education and Factors Influencing its Task.*

The question of the possibility of education is an important one and has provoked a number of answers ranging from one extreme to the other. The Greeks generally believed in the power of education; some of them, however, argued that education could only work within the framework set by inborn capacities, while others tended to overlook nature and argued that education was the decisive factor in one's development.

Among the first group, which overemphasized the power of inborn qualities, Theognis and Pindar are better known,[32] and among the second are Socrates,[33] the Sophists and the Stoics.[34] In between these two groups stood a third one which held that education has a great

30. E. B. Castle, *Moral Education in Christian Times*, p. 207.

31. In his *In Epist. ad Hebr. Hom. VII* Chrysostom writes: διδασκαλίας δεῖται ἡ ἀρετή; PG 63, 75. Concerning his teaching on virtue see A. Panases, *Op. Cit.*, p. 48 f.

32. Theognis, *Eleg.* 437-38; Οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν; Pindar, *Olymp.* IX. 100.

33. Plato, *Protagoras* 361 B. cf. *Meno* 86 C.

34. J. Arnim, *Stoi. Vet. Fragm.* II, 83: ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ..ὥσπερ χάρτην εὔεργον εἰς ἀπογραφήν; cf. *Ibid.*, III, 229.

power but it is certainly not almighty. This view is found in Plato,[35] Aristotle,[36] Plutarch[37] and the Church Fathers.

In the history of education the issue under discussion is known as the *nature-nurture* question. When it first appeared it was more a political than a philosophical issue. The growing challenge of the classical prolerariat forced the aristocracy to maintain that its superior position was due to innate qualities and not to something to be attained by learning.[38] In the early part of this century the nature-nurture controversy was invigorated and it still remains an important issue in the fields of psychology and education.[39] Some believe it to be the most important issue in developmental psychology.[40]

Following the general Christian outlook of man's moral development, Macarius believes in the importance of both nature and nurture, placing the emphasis on the second.

a) Nature.

In modern literature the term heredity is preferred to nature and it is employed to signify the continuity from generation to generation of certain elements of germinal organization,[41] which influence the psychosomatic develpment of man. Macarius and other Fathers use the term nature (φύσις) to signify what modern scholarship calls heredity.

Heredity, according to Macarius, establishes the general framework within which each member of a species moves (XLVI. 1. and 2, p. 339,2 and 16f) and, moreover, equips each individual man differently with endowments of bodily, spiritual, moral, and intellectual nature:[42]

35. Plato, *Laws*, 766 A: *Republic* 415A-C. Regarding his views on the influence of environment on intelligence and character see *Timaeus* 24 C-D and A. H. Armstrong, «Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus» in *Dionysius* vol. I (1977), p. 61 f.

36. Aristotle, *Polit.* 1332A, 38 f.

37. Plutarch, *The Education of Children.* IV.

38. F. A. G. Beck, *Greek Education*, p. 307.

39. F. J. McDonald, «The Influence of Learning Theories on Education». in E. R. Hilgard, *Theories of Learning and Struction*, p. 4 f.

40. H. F. Clarizio, *Contemporary Issues in Educational Psychology*, p. 85.

41. E. Conklin, *Heredity and Environment*, p. 135.

42. Some modern researchers claim that one's mental ability depends mainly upon heredity, though environment is not without effect upon intellectual functioning, see L. Erlenmeyer-Kimling, «Genetics and Intellegence», in H. F. Clarizio, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 86-89.

δίκαια τὰ κρίματα αὐτοῦ (sc. Θεοῦ)... κατ' ἀναλογίαν τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν, ἤτοι σωματικῶν ἤτοι πνευματικῶν ἤτοι γνώσεως ἤτοι συνέσεως ἢ διακρίσεως, ἃ καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει ὁ Θεὸς διαφόρως ἐνέθηκεν (XXIX. 6, p. 297, 14f). On account of this diversity, God does not have the same expectations from all people, but he will judge the moral achievements of each one on the basis of the endowments given to him originally *(Ibid.* p. 297, 18-36). In other cases Macarius makes clear that what man is given is not virtue in a developed stage, but a «proneness» and «fitness» for this or that virtue: προτερήματα εἰσὶν ἐν πολλαῖς ψυχαῖς· ἐν αἷς μὲν εὐφυΐα διανοίας, ἐν αἷς δὲ τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδειότης *(Seven Hom.* IV, 4, vol. 42, p. 27, 30 f; XXVI. 4-5, p. 273, 16-37). This has been better expressed by Clement of Alexandria, who writes: ἐπὶ πᾶσιν εἰδέναι αὐτοὺς κἀκεῖνο ἐχρῆν, ὅτι φύσει μὲν γεγόναμεν πρὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ μὴν ὥστε ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐκ γενετῆς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κτήσασθαι ἐπιτήδειοι.[43] Each individual differs from the other in the degree of his fitness to virtue; Macarius allows a degree of it to all people, which, therefore, opens the way for a virtuous life to everyone (XXXVII. 10, p. 319, 8f). Human nature retained part of its original goodness even after the fall[44] (XVII, 6, p. 245, 14f; XXVI. 21, p. 280, 3f). This common heritage is not limited to fitness towards morality only, but it includes other faculties of human personality as well: ἔθηκεν (ὁ Θεὸς) εἰς αὐτὴν (ψυχὴν) νόμους ἀρετῶν, διάκρισιν, γνῶσιν, φρόνησιν, πίστιν, ἀγάπην καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἀρετὰς (XLVI. 5, p. 341, 7f). Macarius'view on the proneness towards virtue is very close to that which holds that man is born with innate potentialities which later develop into the personal characteristics of each person.[45]

It is also remarkable that Macarius insists on the fact that man inherits aptitudes, since patristic literature, fighting against sin, emphasizes the negative side of heredity, affirming that as a result of original sin man inherits a corruption which, as we have seen, passes down from generation to generation and pervades the entire human nature, i.e., both soul and body *(Neue Hom.* XVIII, 1, vol. 42, p. 93, 7f). All people are subject to the consequences of the fall, but Macarius seems

43. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata.* IV. 11, and 12, VHP. vol. VIII, p. 213-14. Aristotle also has expressed similar views and, moreover, has argued that habit makes perfect what we have been given by nature: see *Ethica Nicom.* II. 1.

44. Gregory of Nyssa expresses the same view and argues that this is affected by the innate desire (ἔρως) of the soul for the good; see W. Jaeger, *Op. Cit.*, p. 76.

45. A. Danases, *Op. Cit.*, p. 53 f.

to believe that some people inherit by nature such extra imperfections as hardness (XXVI, 5, p. 273, 33f). The latter, however, is not in a unchangeable form, but it can easily be influenced by the good *(Ibid.* 6, p. 273, 40f). Imperfections, moreover, are not man's predominant nature (XV. 49, p. 235, 12f), but they come from evil, which as has been said before, is something strange within man (IV. 8, p. 161, 24 f). Macarius, however,believes in evil's power,as is clear from passages like the following one, where he describes the activities of the evil spirits within man: ἔνδοθεν οὖν ἐστιν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕρπον καὶ προϊὸν πνεῦμα πονηρίας, λογιστικόν, κινητικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κάλυμμα τοῦ σκότους, ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος... οὐδὲν οὖν τῶν ἔξωθεν βλάπτειν δύναται ἄνθρωπον, εἰ μὴ τὸ ζῶν καὶ ἐνεργητικὸν τὸ ἐνοικοῦν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ πνεῦμα σκότους (XLII. 3, p. 327, 14f). In spite of this Macarius holds a rather optimistic view of man's future, since he believes that evil's power is hortative and coercive (XXVII, 10, p. 286, 20). Moreover, Macarius believes that since man retains his natural goodness (XXVI. 10, p. 275, 33f; *Ibid.* 21, p. 280, 1f) he has the power to resist evil (XXVII. 22, p. 291, 26f; XLIII, 6, p. 330, 4f). What, however, damps his optimism is his belief that human nature is susceptible to both good and evil and that man has the free will to choose either way (XXVII, 10 and 11, pp. 286, 19f and 287, 8f). With this capacity of man lies the importance of education, since the latter can influence man's final preference.

b) Nurture

The term nurture is a narrower term than that of environment which is usually used by modern scholars, and it is used in the present study to denote all the conscious efforts which the individual or his immediate social environment makes to help him realize the educational aims of the particular society. In the case of Christianity the aim of its educational endeavors, as we have seen, is the moral perfection of its members. We have also seen that Macarius shares with other Christian writers the view that in spite of his inherited aptitudes and imperfections, man is not of a bound nature (δετὴ φύσις) like the other creatures (XXVII. 21, p. 291, 9f). For this reason law was laid down for man, and he is the only creature which is liable to reward or punishment *(Ibid.* p. 291, 11f), since praiseworthy is the one who by his personal resolution, with effort and struggle, chooses the good through his free choice *(Ibid.*, p. 291, 21f). Man, according to Macarius, can attain a virtuous life, provided he wants it and is willing to struggle for it (XV. 42, p. 232, 24f). Monasticism, with its literature and its peculiar

organization aims at assisting the individual in his effort. Macarius, however, makes clear that the assistance which can be offered towards this direction is not unlimited (XVIII. 6, p. 250, 39f). Thus, Macarius accepts that both nature and nurture contribute to the development of man without, however, making clear to what extent each of these factors contributes to man's development. This, however, is a question which still awaits its answer.[46]

In the following we will discuss the qualifications and the role of the educator who actualizes the function of education.

III. *The Qualifications and the Role of the Educator.*

The importance of the teacher's role in the process of education has been pointed out by both classical and Christian writers[47] and it is attested to by modern resarch.[48] Monasticism even in its first steps the need for a guide and a spiritual adviser, because its founders realized that the life of an ascetic was very difficult and it was almost impossible for one to reach its high goals without the guidance of a master.[49] Therefore, monastic literature emphasized very strongly the necessity of having an elder: «Those», says a monastic proverb, «who are not under the law of the governors shall fall like leaves».[50] John Cassian, voicing the ideas of the Egyptian desert, writes that it is foolishness for a monk to think that it is not necessary to have a teacher for the spiritual profession, since for every worldy profession we need one.[51] Similar views are expressed by John Climacus.[52] Macarius, adhering to the general

46. H. F. Clarizio, *Op. Cit.*, p. 85. Concerning the influence of heredity and environment on a person's intelligence most psychologists and educators accept that in the constant interaction between heredity and environment heredity probably determines a top and a bottom limit on each person's IQ score; environment determining the actual Point of development within this range; see I. Gottsman, «Biogenetics and Social Class», in M. Deutsch, *Social Class and Psychological Development*, pp. 25-51.

47. Plato, *Laws* 808 D; Plutarch, *The Education of Children* VII Chrysostom, *Hom. ante Exsilium*, PG. 52, 430.

48. D. E. Hamachek, *Behavior Dynamics in Teaching, Learning and Growth*, p. 342; cf. G. I. Brown, «The Training of Teachers for Affective Roles», in K. Ryan, *Teacher Education*, p. 181.

49. J. Daniélou-H. Marrou, *The first Six Hundred Years*, p. 271.

50. E. Budge, *Paradise*, II, p. 161.

51. John Cassian, «Letter to Leo», in *Philocalia*, vol. 1, p. 90.

52. John Climacus, *Ladder*, tr. L. Moore, p. 51.

monastic tradition argues that the students of the kingdom of heaven always need a guide (*Neue Hom.* I, 1, vol. 42, p. 36, 13f). Everyone who seeks to reach perfection in the spiritual life ought to let his faith and daily conduct be examined and proved by spiritual men (XLVII. 2, p. 348,22f). Therefore, the safest way for a novice to start his vocation is to submit himself to the authority of an elder (*Seven Hom.* III. 8, vol. 42, p. 22,25 f.).

The task of the elder, however, is both great and difficult (*Ep. Magna*, 16, vol. 42, p. 156,17f). The success of the monastic life, argues Macarius, depends a lot on the right mentality of the elders and the other members of a monastic community (*Ep. Magna.* 16. vol. 42, p. 157,12f). Therefore, he proceeds to advise them to have Christ as their model (*Ibid.* 17, p. 157, 28f); he is the perfect model for all Christian teachers.[53] In the exercise of his daily duties the elder should be directed by the zeal of God and mercy of Christ (*Ibid.* 16, p. 157, 9f). All the Fathers emphasize the educational importance of love,[54] which was also underlined lately by many educationists, among whom we mention Pestalozzi, who based all his educational system on it.[55] The task is laborious and the head of the monastic community should devote himself like a merciful father (*Ibid.* 16, p. 156,21f and 38f). The elder, moreover, should be chosen from the spiritually advanced ones (*Neue Hom* I. 1, vol. 42, p. 36,15f; cf. XLVIII. 2, p. 348,22f), since he is to direct his disciples out of his personal experience. Those who have no personal experience in the field of spirituality do not give an accurate account of it (XVII. 12, p. 247,10f)[56] and, therefore, they should not be expected to lead others. Only those who have been for a long time trained and tried can assist the less experienced and feel for them (XXXVIII. 3, p. 321,2f). Personal experience gives authority to verbal teaching (XVII. 9. p. 246,9f). Therefore, one should first acquire the spiritual experience, and secure salvation and eternal life for himself and then attempt to help others in their effort to perfection (XVIII. 6, p. 250,35f).

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53. On some sarcophagi and frescoes of the late third century Christ appears as the divine school master, dressed in the robes of a professor of literature, addressing a quiet circle of discipless; see P. Brown, *The World Late Antiquity*, p. 84.

54. *Apophthegmata*, PG. 65, 208.

55. A. Danases, *Op. Cit.*, p. 75.

56. Research has shown that good teachers are thoroughly knowledgeable in their field; see D. E. Hamachek, «Characteristics of Good Teachers and Implications for Teacher Education», in *Phi Delta Kappan*, vol. L (Febr. 1969), pp. 341-45.

Macarius notes that as untrained civilians are not put to lead an army, this being for the trained ones, in the same way a spiritual leader should be well experienced in his field so that he would be able to illustrate with his work what he is teaching and, therefore, be of real help to his readers (*Neue Hom.* XXIII (2nd version). 5, vol. 42, p. 112,36f).[57] Contemporary social studies accept that previously acquired knowledge and experience influence the development of the individual person and that the eldest members may be especially equipped to serve the long-run interests of society.[58]

All these views on the importance of personal experience help one to understand the great significance asceticism attributes to the role of the spiritual master and, moreover, to the necessity of a close master-disciple relationship. The master knows the way from experience and has the qualities which will enable him to bring out the potential virtues of his disciples (cf. XLVIII. 2, p. 348, 22f).

However, it should be pointed out that all these passages which we have quoted as supporting the necessity of submitting oneself to the authority of a particular elder are taken from the third of the seven *Homilies* published by G. L. Marriott. In the fifty *Homilies* the bond of obedience to a permanent elder, which characterizes coenobitism, is nowhere found, save the Gregorian hierarchy of virtues found in the fortieth *Homily* where obedience is included (p. 322,28), without, however, any special remarks concerning its importance. What the fifty *Homilies* seem to suggest is the quest for spiritual guidance and counseling rather that the submission to a permanent elder (cf. XLVIII. 2, p. 348,22f).

This observation is probably another indication showing that the Macarian corpus of the fifty *Homilies* has stemmed out from the pre-coenobitic monasticism. If Macarius had in mind submission to a permanent elder he would have probably felt obliged to explain how one is supposed to find the right type teacher for himself, as John Climacus and other coenobites do.[59] The only criterion for the selection of an ad-

57. The second version of *Homily* XXIII seems to be a development of the original form of it done probably by another hand; it is used here, however, because it seems to express Macarius' thought on the subject.

58. This is so not only because of the previous experience but also because their personal ambitions are no longer at stake and, therefore, they can afford to take the longer view; see M. W. Riley, «Socialization for the Middle and Later Years», in D. A. Goslin, *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, p. 957 B.

59. John Climacus, *Klimax.* IV. 7 and 124, pp. 29 A and 50 A.

visor Macarius mentions is his experience in the field, as we have seen.

Finally, it is worth noting that in the Macarian system the spiritual counselor remains a director showing the way to moral perfection or a mediator between God and man (*Seven Hom.* III. 9, vol. 42, p. 22, 39f). He never becomes the end itself, as often happens in such relations which are based on what modern psychology calls «transference».[60] In the latter case the spiritual leader becomes a «saviour», and it is not anymore an ambassador of the Saviour, as Christian spiritual leaders should remain. In spite of that, however, in coenobitism the elder's authority over the novice remains unquestioned (cf. *Ibid.* 10-12, p. 22, 24f).[61]

IV. *The School System with which Macarius had been Familiar.*

In Macarius' time in both Rome and the Greek-speaking countries of the Eastern part of the late Roman Empire, there were usually three types of schools corresponding to the three levels of education, i. e., elementary, secondary and higher education.[62] The teacher of the primary school was called in Greek the γραμματιστης[63] or γραμματοδιδάσκαλος[64] or χαμαιδιδάσκαλος (*Neue Hom.* XXIII. 5, vol. 42, p. 113, 11) and in Latin the *literator*[65] ot *primus magister*.[66] His main task was to teach children the latter of the alphabet (τὰ σημεῖα). The teacher of the secondary school was called in Greek the γραμματικὸς and in Latin the *grammaticus*;[67] his main task was to teach grammar in our sense and, moreover, to expose his students to the classical writers. Finally, the teacher of the higher level was called in Greek the ῥήτωρ or σοφιστης and in Latin the *rhetor* or *orator*.[68] The rhetor's task was to prepare his students for the life of public affairs.[69]

60. For more details see W. Toman, «Transference», in *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, vol. III, p. 347.

61. John Climacus, *Klimax.* IV. 8 and 9, p. 29 B.

62. For information on the educational system of late Roman period we mainly rely on H. Marrou, *History of Education in Antiquity*, part III, chapters 3-7 and P. Monroe, *Textbook in the History of Education*, chapter IV.

63. Xenophon, *Symposium.* IV. 27.

64. Plautonius, *Bacchides* 422-23.

65. Suetonius, *Of Grammarians and Rhetors.* IV.

66. Augustine, *Confessions* I. 13.

67. H. Marrou, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 223 and 359.

68. H. Marrou, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 270 and 381.

69. P. Marrou, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 201-203.

The Romans did not make any serious effort to bring any linguistic unification and, therefore, bilingualism remained a characteristic of the Greco-Roman world of late antiquity. In the Latin West, Greek was studied at the secondary school level, which had two types of school: one for the teaching of Greek, and the other for the teaching of Latin.[70] In the Greek-speaking East, Latin was not studied very widely. It was mainly studied by students of law and by those who prepared themselves for a career in public administration.[71]

Macarius' reference to the educational system of his day seems to attest to the above description; he mentions three levels of schooling:

> Ὁ θέλων μαθεῖν γράμματα ἀπέρχεται πρῶτον καὶ μανθάνει τὰ σημεῖα, καὶ ὅταν γένηται ἐκεῖ πρῶτος, ἀπέρχεται εἰς τὴν σχολὴν τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν καὶ ἔστιν ὅλων ἔσχατος. Πάλιν ἐκεῖ ὅταν γένηται πρῶτος, ἀπέρχεται πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν τῶν γραμματικῶν, καὶ ἔστιν πάλιν ἐκεῖ ὅλων ἔσχατος ἀρχάριος. Εἶτα ὅταν γένηται σχολαστικός, ὅλων τῶν δικολόγων ἀρχάριος καὶ ἔσχατός ἐστι. Πάλιν ὅταν ἐκεῖ γένηται πρῶτος, τότε γίνεται ἡγεμών· καὶ ὅταν γένηται ἄρχων, λαμβάνει ἑαυτῷ βοηθὸν τὸν συγκάθεδρον. (XV. 42, p. 232, 15f).

The first school mentioned above is the elementary school where one learns the letters of the alphabet. The second school is not called the school of grammaticus as one would expect, but it is called the σχολὴ τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν. A. J. Mason, who has translated the *Homilies* into English, translates that as the Latin School.[72] This can hardly be a correct rendering for two main reasons:

a) A Greek-speaking student who has just finished elementary school and has not yet studied Greek properly, since this was not done, as even Macarius informs us, in the elementary school, would normally be expected to continue the study of Greek at the secondary level and then to move to a Latin school, if he wanted to study Latin too, though this was not the rule.[73]

b) The second reason is that in the Eastern provinces of the the Empire one would expect the term Ῥωμαϊκὸς to refer to anything of non-local origin. Thus, Greek, which was the language of administra-

70. P. Monroe, *Op. Cit.*, p. 198.
71. H. Marrou, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 344-45.
72. Reprinted by Eastern Orthodox Books, p. 127.
73. H. Marrou, *Op. Cit.*, p. 344 f.

tion in the Eastern provinces,[74] could easily be called τὰ Ρωμαϊκά. That this is a possible case is strongly supported by some other fourth century texts, where the term means Greek,[75] and, moreover, by the fact that even in Greece itself the word Ρωμαϊκὰ came to mean the Greek tongue and the word is often used in that sense up to present time.

Thus, the school where Greek was taught and which was in most cases supported by the municipal government[76] could very easily be called the σχολὴ τῶν Ρωμαϊκῶν. The next school mentioned by Macarius is the σχολὴ τῶν γραμματικῶν. As A. J. Mason[77] correctly noted, this term can hardly be used in the technical sense of grammarians as grammar must have been taught at the previous level. Thus, this should be understood as a school of higher education, the graduates of which were called σχολαστικοὶ and could practice law and very often the successful ones could get into the imperial service, as Macarius and other Fathers testify.[78] This is also supported by another passage of Macarius where he ranks the grammarians among the philosophers, poets, rhetors, historians, all of whom are called by him κατὰ κόσμον σοφοὶ (XLV. 2, p. 336, 5f). This is certainly a much higher rank than that of the teachers of the secondary school. The latter were often slaves, ruined men and failures who enjoyed little regard from the parents.[79]

Finally, it should be mentioned that in a *Homily* which is a development of a *Homily* attributed to Macarius the different kinds of teachers are presented in the following way: χαμαιδιδάσκαλοι, γραμματικοί, ῥήτορες, σοφισταὶ and φιλόσοφοι (*Neue Hom.* XXII (2nd version). 5, vol. 42, p. 113,11f). In this case the grammarians are put in the usual way next to elementary teachers and they are below the rhetors and philosophers. This arrangement differs from that found in *Homily* XIV, quoted above, which is not of dubious origins as one might say for the second version of *Homily* XXIII.

74. H. Marrou, *Op. Cit.*, p. 343.

75. Cf. *Acta Pilati*, ed. C. Tischendorf, *Evangelia Apocrypha*, pp. 215 and 213; concerning this work see J. Quasten, *Patrology*, vol. I, p. 115 f.

76. H. Marrou, *Op. Cit.*, p. 408.

77. H. Marrou, *Op. Cit.*, p. 126 note 1.

78. See also Chrysostom, *Adv. Opp.* III. 12, PG. 47, 369; 13, p. 371; and H. Marrou, *Op. Cit.*, p. 415.

79. H. Marrou, *Op. Cit.*, p. 370.

V. *Macarius' Attitude to Classical Learning*

Monasticism and more generally Christianity did not consider intellectual culture as a goal in itself, since worldly things are transient. Thus, monks renounced the world and its culture, accepting only those cultural elements which they thought might serve their purpose.[80] Saints and not scholars were the models of every monk. The early hermits in particular were suspicious of «worldly knowledge» which was rooted in a quite different understanding of life. Therefore, as H. Marrou puts it, monks were more concerned with forgetting the poetry, the philosophy and in general the secular knowledge they had learned in schools before their conversion, than in further learning.[81]

Macarius is not opposed to learning and Greek thought in general. He argues that all the philosophers and the law and the prophets have to do with purity; Jews and Greeks alike love purity but they cannot be pure (XVII. 5, p. 248, 12f). Thus, he accepts that philosophers had noble motives and objectives and, moreover, that they could reach them to some extent, since through philosophy they have displayed virtue (XLV. 2, p. 336, 5f). Macarius mentions by name three of the classical writers,[82] namely Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates (XLII. 1, p. 326, 30f), and even uses some philosophical terms in his writings (cf. IV. 1, p. 162, 12 and 37) as well as some Platonic similies (cf XL. 5, p. 324, 13f; XXXIII. 3, p. 311, 3),though there are not any obvious traces of a particular philosophical school. He seems to stand basically on Biblical grounds and whatever ideas are of philosophical origin must have come to him indirectly, since there were many of them in the cultural air of his time.

Macarius, however, argues[83] that the ability of philosophy is limited; for instance philosophy cannot help one to comprehend the subtlety of the soul, to speak of its nature (XLIX. 4, p. 359, 9f. cf. XXX IV. 3, p. 313, 1f). to comprehend God (*Neue Hom.* XXII. 1, vol. 42, p.

80. Pachomius, the first monastic legislator, commanded that the novice should be taught writing and reading before he is accepted; see *Pachomii Praecepta*, PG. 40, 949 A and J. O'Connor, *Monasticism and Civilization*, p. 82,

81. H. Marrou, *Op. Cit.*, p. 349; cf. *Hom.* XVII. 15, p. 248,20 f.

82. The terms *sophos* and *sophistes* are synonymous in Macarius (cf. XV. 26, 19; XLV. 2, p. 336,5).

83. He is probably arguing this because philosophical principles are reached through reason, which Macarius believes to be of limited power (XXXIV. 3, p. 313, 1 f).

101, 38 f), or even more to secure salvation for man (XLV. 4, p. 336, 36f). Moreover, philosophy can be easily an obstacle to spiritual progress (XL. 8, p. 330, 39f), or even lead man to heresy (*Neue Hom.* XXII. 1, vol. 42, p. 101, 27f).[84] Therefore, Macarius exhorts his readers to cast away any worldly knowledge or power of words they may have, so that they might build on the true wisdom, which is the preaching of the Cross (XVII. 15, p. 248, 20f). However, he expects Christians to develop their moral reasoning, which, as we will see in the next chapter, Macarius regards as a necessary condition for moral development.

(to be continued)

84. This is a common argument among those early Christian writers who opposed Greek philosophy. A good example is Hippolytus, who claims that the Valentinian heresy is based on Pythagoras and Plato *(Refutation.* VI. 21-29. in VHP, vol. 5, pp. 292, 21-297,36) and, moreover, Tertullian, who writes: «Indeed heresies are themselves instigated by philosophy.» (*Against Heretics.* VII. in ANF, vol. III, p. 246).