

# THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF DIADOCHUS OF PHOTICE\*

BY  
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## CHAPTER I

### THE CREATION OF MAN

#### 1. *Image and Likeness.*

The biblical teaching on man's creation according to the image and likeness of God has been the central point in the history of Christian anthropology.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the terms are not often used in the Bible, and it never gives us any kind of systematic theory about man as the image of God.<sup>2</sup>

Diadochus uses this teaching in his writings: «All men are made in God's image.»<sup>3</sup> He attributes the image of God to the whole human race. In other words, he believes that the image is universal: it belongs to every man, while, in the past, the Gnostics Valentinus and Basilides held that only some men are of divine origin. By the creation of man in God's image Diadochus recognises a primordial correspondence between the being of man and the being of God. The question that arises is, in what way is this similarity reflected in man?

In the writings of the Fathers and the Ecclesiastical writers the biblical teaching of man's creation according to the image of God is used very often and they give many and different explanations. This variety of views does not appear only from the writings of one author

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\* Συνέχεια ἐκ τῆς σελ. 800 τοῦ προηγουμένου τεύχους.

1. In the Old Testament the Image of God is directly mentioned in only three passages: in *Genesis* I, 26, 7; 5,1-3; 9, 5-6 and in the Deuterocanonical literature twice: in *Wisdom of Solomon* 2, 23 and *Wisdom of Sirach* 17, 2-4. In the New Testament a different doctrine of the image is to be found; firstly to describe Christ's singular dignity and divine sonship, and secondly to describe the likeness of God into which believers enter through faith in Christ. The term is used in the Old Testament sense in one passage, in *James* 3, 9.

2. John Chrysostom does not think that the sparsity of the references means that the concept is of no importance. See in *Gen. Hom.* 8 (PG 53, 70): Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὀλίγα τὰ ρήματα, ἀλλὰ πολὺς ὁ ἐγκεκρυμμένος θησαυρός, καὶ προσήκει τοὺς νήφοντας καὶ ἐργηγορότας μὴ μέχει τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἰστασθαι.

3. *Cent.* 4 (86, 11). Πάντες ἄνθρωποι κατ' εἰκόνα ἐσμέν Θεοῦ.

to another, but sometimes we can find different views in the writings of one and the same author.<sup>4</sup>

First of all, according to Diadochus this similarity is not an essential likeness between the Divine and human nature, because he believes that God is immaterial and He has not a defined shape or form<sup>5</sup> while man is synthetic.<sup>6</sup> There is not, however, an identity between image and archetype. This identity is taken in the proper sense according to Paul, only for Jesus who is the real image of God.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, we must deny the view that the image means external resemblance between God and man.<sup>8</sup> Thus the image is attributed either to the spiritual part of man, or to the whole psychosomatic existence of man. Diadochus seems to follow the first view, with the majority of the Church Fathers. That is to say, he attributes the image of God in man to the soul.<sup>9</sup> Particularly, he says that the divine image in man is in the intellectual activity of soul.<sup>10</sup>

Therefore, Diadochus defines the intellect as the image of God in man. This means that he follows the Alexandrian tradition,<sup>11</sup> according to which the image is attributed to the intellect or to the human reason, which is the highest element of man's nature, the principle of his conscience and freedom. It might be said, that it is the seat of the person. This is why the Greek Fathers are often ready to identify the intellect with the image of God in man.

The Antiochene Theologians emphasised the dominion of man

4. Clement of Alex., for instance, in *Protr.* 10 GCS 1, 71 (PG 8, 212C-213A), refers the image to the human mind: εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ... εἰκὼν δὲ τοῦ λόγου ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀληθινός, ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν διὰ τοῦτο γεγενῆσθαι λεγόμενος, while he refers it to reproduction in the *Paed.* 2, 10, GCS, 1, 298 (PG8, 497B).

5. *Vision* 16 (173, 14-15); 19 (175, 2-3).

6. *Vision* 29 (179, 21).

7. In the New Testament Christ is twice said to be the likeness or the image of God; see *II Cor.* 4, 4; *Col.* 1, 15.

8. Some of the biblical investigators accept that the «image» refers to the external similarity between man and God; see J. Skinner, *A critical and exegetical Commentary on Genesis.* 1930 p. 32. Some others accept that it means only the spiritual likeness between God and man. S. R. Driver, *The Book of Genesis.* London, 1948, p. 15.

9. *Cent.* 89 (149, 5-6). Πάσας τὰς γραμμάς τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα.

10. *Cent.* 78 (135, 21). Κατ' εἰκόνα ἔσμεν τοῦ Θεοῦ τῷ νοερῷ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματι.

11. See Origen, *Contra Celsum* 6, 63, ed. M. Barret SC. vol. 147, Paris 1969, p. 336-338 (PG 11, 1393B-1396A). Clem. of Alex., *Protr.* 10 GCS 1, 71 (PG 8, 212C-213A). Athanasius, *De Incarn.* 3, 67 PG 25, 101.

over the whole creation.<sup>12</sup> Also, some of the Fathers, among whom Irenaeus was the first who made this point, attribute the image not only to the soul but also to the body of man being created in the image of God.<sup>13</sup> The variety of these definitions could be seen as an attempt by the Fathers to refrain from confining the image of God to any one part of man because the image of God in man reflects the unknowable character of the divine being. This is the reason why it is impossible to define what constitutes the divine image in man. On the other hand, if Diadochus emphasised the intellect, or other Fathers something else, this does not mean that they are excluding the other functions of a man, but simply emphasising one of them as the basic function of the person. For this reason, personality is the image of God in man because it contains as fundamental elements the intellect, the rationality, the free will or anything else that the Fathers refer to the image.<sup>14</sup>

Diadochus discerns the idea of a movement by man from the «image» to the archetype in the phrase of Genesis καθ' ὁμοίωσιν. The Greek translation by the LXX of Genesis 1,26 ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν, constitutes for Diadochus and the majority of the Fathers the biblical basis on which they developed their dogmatic teaching about man. The conjunction καὶ that the LXX used to connect the two terms provides them with a syntactical reason to distinguish the content of the two terms «image» and «likeness». Thus, the conception of the passage *Gen.* 1, 26 as interpreted by many Fathers, has a different meaning from the original Hebrew text. Today, the majority of the biblical scholars reject this distinction in exegetical as well as in dogmatic literature.<sup>15</sup> As a matter of fact, they find support from the original text בְּעִלְמֵנוּ פְּדוּמֹתֵינוּ containing the terms עֵלֶם (celem) and דְּמוּת (demuth) which are, in fact, synonymous. D. Cairns

12. Diodore of Tarsus, *In Gen.* 1, 26 PG 33, 1564. John Chrysostom in *Gen. Hom.* 8 PG 53, 73. Theodore in *Gen. quaest.* in Num. 20 PG 80, 105 and *Hom.* to 1 Cor. 11, 7, PG 82, 312.

13. Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* 5, 6, 1; 16, 1-2 ed. A. Rousseau, SC, vol. 153, Paris 1969, p. 72-79 and 216-217. *Demonstration of the Apostolic teaching* 11; 22, ed. L. Froidevaux, SC. vol. 62, Paris 1959, p. 64-65. Michael Choniates, *Prosopopoeiae* PG 150, 1361 C.

14. Karl Barth refers the image of God in man to the human personality and his ability to have personal relationship with God and with other men. *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, Vol. II, part I, p. 207 and II, p. 390.

15. See bibliography in G. C. Merkouwer, *Man, The image of God*, U.S.A., 1962, p. 68, note 6.

says that «image and likeness cannot refer to two quite different things». What we have here is a Hebrew parallelism, or as Eichrodt thinks, the second term defines more closely than the first what is meant. «In God's image, that is to say, in his likeness».<sup>16</sup>

Diadochus, using the LXX text, makes a distinction between «image» as potentiality for perfection (i.e., the foundation of the likeness), and «likeness» as perfection realized fully. Thus man has the «image» from the start, but the fullness of the «likeness» lies still in the future. He declares that all men are made in God's image but to be in His likeness is granted only to those who have brought their own freedom into subjection to God.<sup>17</sup> Through this distinction between «image» and «likeness» Diadochus follows the line which started in the patristic literature from Irenaeus<sup>18</sup> and Clement of Alexandria.<sup>19</sup> Very characteristic is the philosophical expression of a passage in Saint Basil, according to which the image is *δυνάμει* of the likeness, while the likeness is the *ἐνεργεία* of image.

Ἔστιν οὖν δύναμει μὲν τὸ ἐν ἐμοὶ λογικὸν καὶ νοερόν, ὃ δὴ καὶ κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ πεποιῆσθαι με δεῖνυσιν· ἐνεργεία δέ, τὸ καὶ ἀντιποιηθῆναι τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ πράξει κατορθῶσαι τὸ καλὸν καὶ οὕτως ἐλθεῖν διὰ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας εἰς τὸ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ.<sup>20</sup>

Diadochus through this distinction of the two terms makes clear, first of all, the original state of man after the creation, and secondly he expresses the purpose of man's life. He defines the human being not as a static and perfected being, but rather as a dynamic person who is in continuous progress.

The fall of man brought about only the obscuring but not the full destruction of the Image. For this reason God's grace through baptism restores the divine image; man's co-operation is then required for the attaining of the likeness to God. Of course to be like God is not an easy thing and man needs a long time to achieve this through the development of the virtues.<sup>21</sup> The basic virtue to achieve the likeness, according to Diadochus, is the surrender of human free-will to God. This is the root principle of asceticism: a free renunciation of one's own

16. D. Cairns, *The image of God in man*, London, 1953, p. 28.

17. *Cent.* 4 (86, 11-13).

18. *Adv. Haer.* 5, 1, 3 ed. A. Rousseau, SC. vol. 153, Paris 1969, p. 28.

19. *Strom.* II, 22 ed. Cl. Mondésert, SC. vol. 38, Paris 1954, p. 153 (PG 8, 1086).

20. *De hominis Structura Oratio* 1, 21 PG 30, 32C.

21. *Cent.* 89 (149, 7-22).

will, in order to recover true liberty. The human hypostasis can only realise itself by the renunciation of its own will. Only when a man does not belong to himself does he become like God.<sup>22</sup>

The likeness of God follows certain stages. The beginning is known when the intellect has the experience of the Holy Spirit; then man realises that grace is beginning to paint the divine likeness over the divine image. The *αΐσθησις* shows that men are being formed into the divine likeness.<sup>23</sup>

According to Diadochus the likeness to God is «in so far as possible to be like God».<sup>24</sup> This phrase recalls the Platonic passage of *Theaetetus*. Plato first declared that the goal of man was assimilation to the divinity: «We should make all speed to take flight from this world to the other; and that means becoming like the divine as far as we can and that again is to become righteous with the help of wisdom».<sup>25</sup> The above passage from the *Theaetetus* is copied out by Clement of Alexandria<sup>26</sup> and closely followed by Plotinus<sup>27</sup> and by some Fathers.<sup>28</sup> Finally, Diadochus recognises in the likeness of God the deification of man as the last stage of man's transfiguration in Christ.

## 2. *The ontological character of the body.*

The idea of many classical Greek Philosophers is well known that the human body is bad of its very essence. This idea originally comes from the Orphic teaching about the body as the grave of the soul which has influenced the later thought of Greek Philosophers such as Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, Aristotle (in his early thought) and Plotinus.

This Orphic doctrine had a tremendous and, one is sometimes tempted to say, unfortunate fascination for Plato in particular. In the *Cratylus*, Plato is discussing the etymology of the word *σῶμα* (body) and its possible connection with *σῆμα* (grave). He writes: «Now some

22. *Cent.* 4 (86, 13-14). "Ὅτε γὰρ οὐκ ἔσμεν ἑαυτῶν, τότε ὅμοιοι ἔσμεν τῷ ἡμᾶς ἑαυτοῦ δι' ἀγάπης καταλλάξαντι.

23. *Cent.* 89 (149, 22-24).

24. *Cent.* 89 (150, 5-6).

25. *Theaetetus*, 176a 8-b<sub>3</sub> and *Rep.* 501b; 613a 7-b<sub>1</sub> εἰς ἕσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοιοῦσθαι Θεῷ.

26. *Strom.* II, 19 ed. Cl. Mondésert, SC. vol. 38, Paris 1954, p. 109.

27. *Ennead* 4, 2, 4; 4, 2, 3.

28. See for instance, St. Basil, *De Spir. Sanct.* 1, 2, PG 32, 69.

say that the body is the σῆμα (grave) of the soul, as if it were buried in its present existence; and also because through it the soul makes signs of whatever it is rightly named from σῆμα.<sup>29</sup>

In a few words, for Plato the body is at best a nuisance and at worst an evil and in no way part of the true self, which is exhausted in content by the soul. The body is an influence for harm, and the life of the good man will be a process of purification from it, in the hope of achieving a reward elsewhere.

Aristotle, in his first period of thought under the influence of Plato's *Phaedo*, wrote the lost dialogue *Eudemus* or «On the soul» where he considers the life without the body as natural and healthy.<sup>30</sup>

Plotinus, as far as we know from his biographer Porphyrius, seemed ashamed of being in the body. He could never bear to talk about his race, and he objected strongly to sitting for a painter to allow a portrait of himself to be made.<sup>31</sup>

During the first Christian centuries the Gnostics were against the human body, as were some Christian writers under the influence of the above writers. It is interesting to examine the teaching of Diadochus, as an Eastern ascetic writer, about the body.

According to Diadochus the body is one of the components of man. He characterises the nature of the body by the Aristotelian term

29. *Cratylus* 400C. Καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινες φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς (sc. σῶμα), ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι· καὶ διότι αὐτοῦ σημαίνει ἃ ἂν σημαίνει ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ ταύτη σῆμα ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι. δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σφῆζῃται, δεσμοτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ὡσπερ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, (τὸ) σῶμα, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν οὐδὲ ἐν γράμμα. See also *Phaedo* 66-β5-7 ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπερφυμένη ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ μετὰ τοιοῦτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν.

30. *Proclus Plat. Rep.* 12 (V. Rose, *Aristotelis fragmenta*, p. 47, fr. 41) ... εἰκέναι δὲ τὴν μὲν ἄνευ σώματος ζῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατὰ φύσιν οὖσαν (ὕγεια, νόσφ δὲ τὴν ἐν σώματι ὄθεν) σημαίνει τὰς μὲν ἐκεῖθεν ἰούσας ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ, τὰς δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἐκεῖσε τῶν ἐνταῦθα διαμνημονεύειν.

31. Porphyry, *Vita Plotini*, 1-10. Πλωτῖνος ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς γερονὸς φιλόσοφος ἐώκει μὲν αἰσχυρομένφ ὅτι ἐν σώματι εἶη. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως οὔτε περὶ τοῦ γένους αὐτοῦ διηγεῖσθαι ἠνελεγο οὔτε περὶ τῶν γονέων οὔτε περὶ τῆς πατρίδος. Ζωγράφου δὲ ἀνασχέσθαι ἢ πλάστου τοσοῦτον ἀπηξίλου ὥστε καὶ λέγειν πρὸς Ἀμέλιον δεόμενον εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι ἐπιτρέψαι· οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ ὁ ἡ φύσις εἰδῶλον ἡμῖν περιτέθεικεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰδῶλον εἰδῶλου συγχωρεῖν αὐτὸν ἀξιούν πολυχρονιώτερον καταλιπεῖν ὡς δὴ τι τῶν ἀξιοθεάτων ἔργων;

πυκνότητα<sup>32</sup> that is, density of its material... τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν πυκνότητα.<sup>33</sup> Body is earth and is connected with the earthly.<sup>34</sup>

For Diadochus it is totally impossible, metaphysically speaking, for the human body to be evil and the grave or the prison of the soul because evil does not exist by nature, nor is any man naturally evil, nor does evil come from the material part of man.<sup>35</sup> The body is created by God and for this reason must be ontologically good, because God made nothing that was not good.<sup>36</sup> The body is an inalienable part of man. Furthermore the conception of body and its natural purity, according to Diadochus, is confirmed indirectly by the fact of the incarnation of Christ. In many quotations Diadochus refers to the taking of a human body by the incorporeal Lord.<sup>37</sup> He characteristically says that the Word of God took form.<sup>38</sup> He refutes Docetic teaching on the incarnation, and he emphasizes that the Word of God participates substantially in the density of human nature.<sup>39</sup> The flesh of the Lord was exactly the same as the flesh of the rest of mankind. Christ ascended with His flesh,<sup>40</sup> and He will come back in the eschatological time as God and man.<sup>41</sup> The human nature will be united for ever with the Word of God. Because of the Incarnation, Christ will be visible at the fulfilment of the kingdom.<sup>42</sup>

Ontologically the body is good, but morally and in practice, it is neutral. In fact, the body, as we know it, is different from what it was when it was created. The fall of man has changed the body's first natural state. Diadochus says that the body became subject to corruption since Adam's fall.<sup>43</sup> Particularly, he teaches that while the Devil is expelled from the soul by baptism, he is permitted to act against man in

32. Aristotle, *Physics* 8, 7, 260 b 10.

33. *Vision* 19 (174, 24-25).

34. *Cent.* 26 (96, 15).

35. *Cent.* 3 (86, 2). Τὸ κακὸν οὔτε ἐν φύσει ἐστὶν οὔτε μὴ φύσει τίς ἐστὶ κακός.

36. *Cent.* 3 (86, 3).

37. *Sermon* 5 (167, 25-26). Ὁ γὰρ ἀσώματος, ἑαυτὸν τῇ προσλήψει τῆς σαρκὸς εἰδοποιήσας ...

38. *Vision* 21 (176, 1-2) ... διὰ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς εἶδος ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος παρῆν.

39. *Sermon* 6 (168, 13-14).

40. *Sermon* 5 (167, 23-25).

41. *Sermon* 5 (168, 4-6).

42. *Vision* 21 (175, 23-26).

43. *Cent.* 78 (135, 22-24) ... διὰ τῆς παραβάσεως τοῦ Ἀδάμ ... τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν τῆ φθορᾷ ὑπέπεσεν...

the body because of the weakness of the flesh. The evil spirits invade through and lurk in the bodily senses, and they try to capture the soul by violence, especially when they find men faint-hearted in pursuing the spiritual path.<sup>44</sup>

However, Diadochus recognises that so long as men dwell in this corruptible body they are absent from God.<sup>45</sup> In this passage there is not a kind of Platonic nostalgia for being away from the body but Diadochus is here referring to the body in its fallen state. Behind his phrase lies the Pauline thought: «we know that while we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith not by sight. We are of good courage, and we would rather be away from the body and at home with the Lord. So whether we are at home or away, we make it our aim to please Him» (II Cor. 5,6). It is true that in St. Paul's letters we find a theology of the body which some of the Fathers have fully developed. In fact, Paul did not dualistically distinguish between man's self and his body; he did not expect a release of the self from its bodily prison. By the term *σῶμα* (body) he does not mean only bodily form or just body but the whole human person.

Body sometimes can be translated simply «I». That the body belongs to human existence is most clearly evident from the fact that Paul cannot conceive even of a future human existence without the body — in contrast to the view of those in Corinth who deny the resurrection (I Cor. 15). It may be also significant that Paul never calls a corpse body. On the other hand by the significant term *σὰρξ* (flesh) Paul designates the fallen man, the enslavement of man to the power of flesh and sin. «Flesh and blood» is a phrase that denotes human weakness. This is the point of view from which we must understand the passage in Rom. 7,5, «while we were living in the flesh...» In addition to that, the body can become the instrument of sin, body of flesh or body of sin and death (Rom. 6, 6; 7, 14; Col. 2, 11); for this he advises «Let not sin... reign in your mortal bodies, to make you obey their passions» (Rom. 6, 12), on the other hand, he teaches that the body can be the temple of the Holy Spirit (I Cor. 6, 19). Thus the bodily existence of man is a reality of present and future life. The basic principle of Paul's thought is the freedom of the body from the power of the flesh and sin and its subordination to the grace of the Holy Spirit.

44. *Cent.* 79 (137, 10-12; 17-21).

45. *Cent.* 36 (105, 17-18). Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἴσμεν ὅτι, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδημοῦμεν ἐν τῷ φθαρτῷ τοῦτῳ σώματι ἐκδημοῦμεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ... (II Cor. 5, 6).



John Chrysostom, commenting on Paul, emphasizes that by the term flesh Paul does not mean body but the secular life: Σάρκα καὶ ἐνταῦθα οὐ τὸ σῶμά φησιν οὐδὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ τὸν σαρκικὸν βίον καὶ κοσμικόν, καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ἀσωτίας γέμοντα, τὸν ὅλον σάρκα ποιοῦντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον... Καὶ οὗτος τῆς λέξεως ὁ τρόπος καὶ ἐν τῇ Παλαιᾷ πολλαχοῦ κεῖται, σάρκα σημαίνων τὸν παχὺν καὶ πηλώδη βίον, καὶ ἡδοναῖς ἐμπεπλεγμένον ἀτόποις.<sup>46</sup> The same author explains the saying of Paul in II Cor. 5, 1-9 where Paul does not mean that we must be away from the body but from corruption.<sup>47</sup> The same explanations of Paul's ideas are found in modern scholars such as Bultmann and Schweizer.<sup>48</sup>

Diadochus used the term σῶμα (flesh) not only to define the material part of man but to express the reality of the fallen man under the domination of sin,<sup>49</sup> while he uses the term σῶμα (body) mainly to describe the human body. Thus when Diadochus speaks of being away from the body it means being away from the body of flesh, which is an obstacle in spiritual life and mystical experience. In this case Diadochus teaches that we must refine our material nature through our labours.<sup>50</sup>

He maintains that the practice of temperance has the effect of refining the human body<sup>51</sup> and causing every appetite or the bodily sense to wither away.<sup>52</sup> Behind this point lies the Pauline saying: «I pommel my body and subdue it».<sup>53</sup>

It is noticeable that we find in the ascetic tradition two almost different views of the meaning of self-control which take for granted

46. *In Ep. ad. Rom.* Hom. 13, PG 60, 517.

47. *In II Cor.* Hom 10, 2 PG 61, 468: οὐ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο στενάζομεν, φησίν, ἵνα τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγῶμεν ... ἀλλὰ τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ σπεύδομεν ἐλευθερωθῆναι ... οὐχ ὅτι σῶμα, ἀλλ' ὅτι φθαρτὸν περικεῖμεθα σῶμα καὶ παθητὸν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ τὴν λύπην παρέχει.

48. R. Bultmann, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, Tübingen, 1964, 4 p. 234. E. Schweizer, σάρξ, σαρκικός, σάρκινος in G. Kittel, *Theo. Wört. Zum. N. T.*, vol. 7, p. 98-104.

49. *Cent.* 57 (117, 26): πνεύματι γὰρ περιπατῶν τὰς τῆς σαρκὸς ἐπιθυμίας εἶδέναι οὐ δύναται. See also 79 (137, 14); 80 (138, 10); 81 (139, 5); 82 (142, 14); 83 (143, 18), 87 (148, 23). Notice that he also uses the term flesh in the Christological sense to express the Incarnation of the Word of God or his personality. *Cent.* 80 (138, 6), *Sermon* 5 (167, 25-26).

50. *Cent.* 24 (96, 15-17).

51. *Cent.* 71 (131, 5-6).

52. *Cent.* 25 (97, 5-6).

53. *I Cor.* 9, 27.

two different views about body, one almost Platonic and the other biblical.

Palladius (4-5 cent.), for instance, in his book *Lausiac History* has written a story about an old monk who all the day was working hard even though he was very old because as he said, he preferred to kill his body in order not to allow his body to kill him.<sup>54</sup> This attitude certainly has a Platonic veiw. On the other hand, in the «Apo-phthegmata patrum» the great monk Poemen suggested that through temperance we do not try to kill our body but only our passions ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐδιδάχθημεν σωματοκτόνοι ἀλλὰ παθοκτόνοι.<sup>55</sup> What then is the opinion of Diadochus on this topic? Diadochus teaches that the objective purpose of self-control is not to destroy and annihilate the human body but to control it, in order to succeed in the spiritual life. The body of one pursuing the spiritual way must not be enfeebled because when the body is weakened by excessive self-control, the body makes the contemplative faculty of the soul dejected and disinclined to concentrate. Therefore, Diadochus teaches that man should regulate his food according to the condition of the body. When the body is in good health it must be a appropriately disciplined, while when it is weak it must be adequately nourished. Man must have enough strength for his labours so that the soul may be suitably purified through bodily exertion.<sup>56</sup>

However, self-control affects the state of the body. Thus through exertions man can undergo death while still alive; then he becomes the dwelling place of the Holy Spirit. Such a man before he has died has already risen from the dead.<sup>57</sup> He is both present in this life and not present in it, still dwelling in the body, he yet departs from it, as through love he journeys towards God in his soul.<sup>58</sup>

The ontological purity of the human body is proved as well from the idea of the glorification and resurrection of the body. Diadochus teaches that the body as well as the intellect participates in the goodness of God according to its progress. The body is not an obstacle in the spiri-

54. *Lausiac History*, 2.

55. *Apo-phthegmata, Poemen*, PG 65, 184.

56. *Cent.* 45 (111, 4-12).

57. *Cent.* 82 (142, 17-21). Εἰ δέ τις δυναθεῖ ζῶν ἔτι διὰ τῶν πόνων ἀποθανεῖν, ὅλος λοιπὸν γίνεται οἶκος τοῦ ἀγίου πνεύματος· πρὶν γὰρ ἀποθάνῃ ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀνέστη, ὡσπερ ἦν αὐτὸς ὁ μακάριος Παῦλος καὶ ὅσοι τελείως ἠγωνίσαντο καὶ ἀγωνίζονται κατὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας.

58. *Cent.* 14 (91, 14-16). Ἐτι γὰρ ἐνδημῶν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι ἐκδημεῖ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης τῇ κινήσει τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαύστως πρὸς τὸν Θεόν.

tual life. This means that Diadochus does not accept merely an intellectual contemplation of God. Of course the full participation of the whole man in the glory of God will take place in the eschatological time, but since man has been baptized into Christ he has been already buried and raised with Him. The Kingdom of God is not only a future but a present reality. Thus grace since baptism, through the receptive organ of the intellect, brings an ineffable joy to the body.<sup>59</sup> The intellect communicates its joy to the body according to the measure of the body's progress. This joy which then fills both soul and body is a true reminder of the life without corruption, that is to say, of the *status ante peccatum*, of the Original State of man before the fall.<sup>60</sup> The illumination of knowledge becomes perceptible even in the bones, and such a man no longer knows himself but is completely transformed by the love of God.<sup>61</sup> The body, ontologically speaking, is not an obstacle to communication with God. Man appreciates God not only with his spiritual existence but as a whole person with his body.

The idea of the glorification of the human body explains the respect and love given to the Saints' relics by the ancient Church. It was not ignorance or superstition but it comes from a well developed theology of the body.

A new reality for the human body has started with the resurrection of Christ, a fact which will be a reality for all mankind in the eschatological time. Diadochus' belief that our body will be risen is the opposite view to that of Hellenistic dualism which considers body as a temporary and external element. According to Diadochus, the body was not created mortal from the beginning. Destruction was not its natural destiny. But bodily death, as we said, happened as a result of Adam's sin. He does not think of death as the day of the soul's deliverance from the prison of the body but as the captivity of body in corruption. Christ through his resurrection liberated mankind from the captivity of death.<sup>62</sup> Since then the incorruptibility of the body is indoubtedly an eschatological reality;<sup>63</sup> man in the end will not be an invisible spirit but a complete man with a body. For this reason the soul after the body's death awaits the resurrection in order to take its body again.<sup>64</sup>

59. *Cent.* 79 (137, 15-17).

60. *Cent.* 25 (97, 6-9).

61. *Cent.* 14 (91, 11-14).

62. *Sermon* 2 (165, 19-21).

63. *Vision* 13 (172, 23-24).

64. *Vision* 26 (177, 15-18).

In conclusion, the bodily existence of man is his basic characteristic; the body is not blamed as being a bad element from its nature but it is refined by the light of the bodily resurrection of Christ. The basic principle is the deliverance of the body from the power of the flesh and sin and its obedience to the power of the Holy Spirit. The salvation of man is not achieved by deliverance from the body or the material but by a transformation of the whole man.

### 3. *The nature and the characteristics of soul.*

According to Diadochus the soul of man is immaterial and without form or shape; also for this reason it is not visible.<sup>65</sup> Nevertheless he also teaches that the nature of the soul is subtle, while the body's nature is characterised by its density.<sup>66</sup> Diadochus seems to accept the Stoic conception of the soul's nature, although he has not defined this point clearly. The Stoics believed that the nature of the soul is not immaterial but that it consists of a kind of light material.<sup>67</sup> This idea is found also in the Macarian Homilies.<sup>68</sup>

Diadochus often speaks about the *μέρη* (parts) of the soul;<sup>69</sup> he does not mean an ontological division of the soul in parts, but rather of aspects or powers within the soul. He simply follows the Platonic tripartition of man's soul into *λογιστικόν*, *θυμικόν*, and *ἐπιθυμητικόν*,<sup>70</sup> a teaching which has entered in the Christian tradition through Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nanzianzus<sup>71</sup> and Evagrius.<sup>72</sup> Diadochus mentions the *θεωρητικόν* (the contemplative faculty of the soul) which is equiv-

65. *Vision* 18 (174, 1-3; 25-26). Διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μήτε ἀγγέλους μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν ὁρᾶσθαι δύνασθαι, ἀσχημάτιστα αὐτὰ ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ νοεῖν εἶναι ζῶα ... καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τοὺς ἀγγέλους ἅλλα δεῖ ζῶα λέγειν καὶ ἀνείδεα.

66. *Vision* 18 (174, 15-17); 19 (174, 24-25).

67. See *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Collegit: Johannes ab Arnim, Lipsiae in Aedibus B.G. Teubneri MCMVI. 518 Nemesius de nathom. 32, and II 811, Diogenes Laert. 7, 157.

68. *Hom.* 49 ed. H. Dörries, E. Klostermann, M. Kroeger, p. 34.

69. *Cent.* 11 (89, 13); 34 (104, 10); 74 (133, 5).

70. *Rep.* 4, 435e-436a. (2a) Clement of Alex., *Paed.* 3, 1 GCS 1 p. 236.

71. Gregory of Nanzianzus, *Poemata* 2, 1, 47 (PG 37, 1381A-1384A).

72. Evagrius, *Practicus* 89 ed. Guillaumont, p. 680-682. Τριμεροῦς δὲ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς οὐσης κατὰ τὸν σοφὸν ἡμῶν διδάσκαλον, ὅταν μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ μέρει γένηται ἡ ἀρετὴ, καλεῖται φρόνησις καὶ σύνεσις καὶ σοφία· ὅταν δὲ ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ, σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀγάπη καὶ ἐγκράτεια· ὅταν δὲ ἐν τῷ θυμικῷ ἀνδρεία καὶ ὑπομονὴ ἐν ὅλῃ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ δικαιοσύνη.

alent to λογιστικόν. The contemplative faculty of the soul is the centre of man's spiritual activities which must remain clear, so that man can devote himself to the contemplation of the divine.<sup>73</sup>

He also mentions the θυμῶδες part of soul, which is equivalent to θυμοειδές or θυμικόν. The θυμῶδες is the centre of courage, which is aroused against evil passions.<sup>74</sup>

Diadochus also speaks about the lineaments (γραμμαι) of the soul by which he probably means the characteristics of the soul.<sup>75</sup>

Following the Alexandrian tradition, he refers the image of God to the soul and particularly to the νοῦς,<sup>76</sup> (intellect). Νοῦς for Diadochus means not just the discursive reason, but direct, intuitive awareness of spiritual truth. It is the contemplative faculty by which man is able to seek God; the principle of man's conscience and freedom. He also thinks of nous as the very depth of the soul<sup>77</sup> and that man can sometimes see the light of his intellect in the depths of the heart.<sup>78</sup> Diadochus does not use the term πνεῦμα with reference to man. When he uses the adjective πνευματικόν, this seems to be closely related to νοερός.

Diadochus describes soul as rational.<sup>79</sup> Another characteristic of the soul is the power of free will,<sup>80</sup> which forms the basic element of his anthropology. Because of free will man fell, and as result of Adam's fall the lineaments of the form imprinted on the soul were befouled,<sup>81</sup> and the perceptive faculty of the soul, which is naturally single, was split into two distinct modes of operation.<sup>82</sup>

Before baptism Satan lurks in the depths of soul but from the moment of baptism the grace of God dwells in the depths of the soul, that is to say in the intellect.<sup>83</sup> Thus the soul can be bad or good and in the case of sin only the Holy Spirit can purify the intellect.<sup>84</sup> Diadochus emphasizes that it is necessary to cultivate the virtues which have the

73. *Cent.* 45 (144, 7); 75 (134, 4).

74. *Cent.* 10 (89, 4).

75. *Cent.* 78 (135, 23); 89 (149, 5).

76. *Cent.* 78 (135, 21); 89 (149, 5-6).

77. *Cent.* 79 (137, 5-6).

78. *Cent.* 59 (119, 9-11).

79. *Cent.* 67 (128, 1).

80. *Cent.* 5 (86, 18).

81. *Cent.* 78 (135, 22-23).

82. *Cent.* 25 (96, 19-20; 97, 1); 29 (100, 1-6).

83. *Cent.* 79 (137, 2-6).

84. *Cent.* 28 (99, 6).

power to purify the inner man (ἐνδον ἀνθρωπων).<sup>85</sup> He also gives the criteria for judging the spiritual progress of the soul. When, he says, man becomes unduly distressed at being ill, he should recognise that his soul is still the slave of bodily desires and so longs for physical health, not wishing to lose the good things of this life and even finding it a great hardship not to be able to enjoy them because of illness. If, however, the soul accepts thankfully the pains of illness, it is clear that it is not far from the realm of dispassion; as a result it even waits joyfully for death as the entry into truer life.<sup>86</sup> Thus the soul will not desire to be separated from the body unless it becomes indifferent to the air it breathes, that is to say, unless the soul becomes independent of the atmosphere which the present life creates.<sup>87</sup> Plato, in *Phaedo*, gives the definition of purification as the separation of the soul from the body... χωρίζειν μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν.<sup>88</sup> For Plato the best thing for a philosopher is to be detached from the body and direct his attention to the soul's return home, that is, to the place whence it originally came. In the above quotations, the main subject of Diadochus' discussion was the criteria of the soul's spiritual progress and not the ontological separation of the soul from the body or the acceptance of illness as something really good. Diadochus also mentions, in another passage, the experience of someone who had a conscious knowledge of divine love, and he felt strongly that his soul longed with an inexpressible joy and love to leave the body and go to the Lord and to become unaware of this transient form of life.<sup>89</sup>

Here Diadochus does not quite have in mind a Platonic view of separation of the soul from the body and return to the spiritual world, but his emphasis is more on the total dedication of man to the Lord and the rejection of this transient life. We find support for this explanation in other passages where Diadochus explains that the soul after death, because of the separation from its body, has a total absence of knowl-

85. *Cent.* 42 (109, 18-19).

86. *Cent.* 54 (116, 2-11).

87. *Cent.* 55 (116, 13-14). Οὐκ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ ἡ ψυχὴ χωρισθῆναι τοῦ σώματος, εἰ μὴ ἄποιος αὐτῇ ἢ πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα τοῦτον διάθεσις γένοιτο.

88. *Phaedo* 67C. χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσει αὐτὴν καθ' ἑαυτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνῃ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐλευομένην, ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.

89. *Cent.* 91 (152, 8-15).

edge of spatial events,<sup>90</sup> and it prays ἐνδιαθέτω λόγῳ and waits until the resurrection of the body.<sup>91</sup>

Σῶμα μὲν χωρῖσαι ψυχῆς, μόνον ἐστὶ τοῦ συνδήσαντος· ψυχὴν δὲ ἀπὸ σώματος, καὶ τοῦ ἐπιειμένου τῆς ἀρετῆς. Τὴν γὰρ ἀναχώρησιν μελέτην θανάτου καὶ φυγὴν τοῦ σώματος οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν ὀνομάζουσιν.<sup>92</sup>

Evagrius characteristically said that the right to separate body from soul belongs to the Creator. But the right to separate soul from body belongs to him who is dedicated to virtue. Our Fathers call the monastic life a study of death and flight from the body.

Diadochus does not say anything about the pre-existence of the soul. Of course, he believes in the existence of the soul after death. In fact, he declares that after death the soul separates from the body and it continues to exist waiting for the resurrection.<sup>93</sup> Probably he did not have the opportunity to refer to the immortality of the soul, or he does not mention the immortality simply because he wanted to emphasize the resurrection as the answer of the salvation of the whole man from corruption.

In conclusion, Diadochus' conception of soul is between the Origenistic theory of soul, which has been accepted by Evagrius, and the Stoic conception, which is found in the Messalians and Ps. Macarius.

#### 4. *The unity of man.*

The majority of the Fathers of the Church seem to accept that human nature consists of body and soul. This is also Diadochus' teaching. V. Lossky says that «the difference between the partisans of trichotomy and dichotomy is in effect simply one of terminology. The trichotomists regard the nous as a superior faculty by which man enters into communion with God. The human person or hypostasis contains the parts of this natural complex, and finds expression in the totality of the human being, which exists in and through it.»<sup>94</sup>

The question of the relationship between body and soul and the centre of man's personality was discussed in antiquity by many Greek Philosophers and Christian thinkers. There were two theories answering the above question.

90. *Vision* 29 (179, 15-21).

91. *Vision* 26 (177, 13-18).

92. Evagrius, *Practicus* 52, ed. Guillaumont, p. 618.

93. *Vision* 26 (177, 15-17).

94. V. Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, London 1957, p. 127.

The first believes that body and soul are two aspects of the same reality. Body is a condensation of the soul, and in this case the soul is the internal aspect of the body. The second distinguishes between soul and body. The soul is spiritual, immortal, indissoluble, while the body is material, mortal and dissoluble; the opposition between soul and body is essential and absolute.

The question arises: does Diadochus follow the first or the second theory?

In contrast with the Platonic view that man does not have a soul but is a soul,<sup>95</sup> Diadochus teaches that man is a perfect unity of soul and body as Aristotle,<sup>96</sup> the Stoics<sup>97</sup> and the majority of the Fathers accepted. The relationship between soul and body cannot be defined according to the Platonic view as an external relationship of two unnaturally united elements, but Diadochus agrees that there is a close relationship between them, which is expressed by the term σύγκρασις.

This term is attributed to the Messalians in Timothy of Constantinople<sup>98</sup> and in the Macarian Homilies.<sup>99</sup> In particular, Diadochus, like Irenaeus<sup>100</sup> and John Climacus<sup>101</sup> uses the term σύγκρασις (admixture) to describe the relationship between body and soul. Man has his wholeness ἐν τῇ συγκράσει of body and soul.<sup>102</sup> For this reason when the soul is separated from the body it has a total absence of knowledge of spatial events.<sup>103</sup> The soul expresses itself in the body<sup>104</sup> and when man commits himself wholly to God he is purified in soul and body as

95. Ps. Plato, *Alcibiades* 130C. ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος.

96. Aristotle in his early writings was under the influence of Plato and supported the division between body and soul. Later in his book, *De anima*, he characterizes soul as the ἐντελέχεια of body, that is the realization of the body, and he accepts the real unity of the two components of man.

97. The Stoics supported this unity as well, especially Chrysippus. See Armin., *Stoicorum veterum Fragmenta* II 473, p. 154-155.

98. Timothy of Constantinople, *De iis qui ad ecclesiam accedunt*, PG 86, 49-51 prop. 6.

99. *Hom.* 18,10 ed. H. Dörries, E. Klostermann, M. Kroeger, p. 181. *Hom.* 52, 6 ed. G. L. Marriott, p. 27.

100. *Adv. Haer* 5, 6, 1 ed. A. Rousseau SC vol. 153, Paris 1969, p. 73, 79.

101. *Scala Paradisi* 15 PG 88, 904A. ... Τίς ὁ λόγος τῆς ἐμῆς συγκράσεως.

102. *Vision* 29 (179, 21)... ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῇ συγκράσει τὸ δλόκληρον ἔχει.

103. *Vision* 29 (179, 15-20)... ἐπειδὴ γὰρ διὰ τῆς συγκράσεως τοῦ σώματος ἐν τόπῳ γίνεται ...

104. *Vision* 25 (177, 13-18).



well.<sup>105</sup> Thus man meets God as a whole being. Neither of the two components separated is the real man, but both are the necessary elements of man. Diadochus describes body as the soul's dwelling place: τὸ γὰρ σῶμα ὡσπερ οἶκος αὐτῆς ἐστίν<sup>106</sup> and as the veil of the soul. (παραπέτασμα).<sup>107</sup>

Because of the synthesis of these two elements in one close unity the different activities of body or soul affect each other. Thus when the body is heavy with over-eating it makes the intellect spiritless and sluggish; likewise when the body is weakened by excessive self-control it makes the contemplative faculty of the soul dejected and disinclined to concentrate.<sup>108</sup> Indeed, according to Diadochus, there is a close connection and coherence between soul and body, a view which is also found in the majority of the Fathers.<sup>109</sup> Even more between the two components of man there is not an enormous gulf in their basic substance. Diadochus seems to go further when compared with other Fathers, because as we can probably infer from his words, body and soul are created from one and the same essence, but only in different degrees of density.<sup>110</sup> This idea is common to all the Stoics<sup>111</sup> and to the Macarian Homilies.<sup>112</sup>

Although Diadochus accepts a close connection between soul and body, nevertheless he also speaks about the disunion between them. According to the Apostle, Diadochus writes, the intellect always de-

105. *Cent.* 78 (136, 4-6)... ὅθεν εὐθέως καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, εἶπερ ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου διαθέσεως προσέρχεται τις τῷ Θεῷ ... see also 85 (144, 19).

106. *Cent.* 78 (135, 22).

107. *Cent.* 71 (131, 5).

108. *Cent.* 45 (111, 4-7).

109. *Ps. Justin, De Resurr.* 7 and 8 (PG 6, 158B). Τί γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστῶς ζῶον λογικόν; Μὴ οὖν καθ' ἑαυτὴν ψυχὴ ἄνθρωπος; Οὐκ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆ. Μὴ οὖν καλοῖτο σῶμα ἄνθρωπος; Οὐκ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου σῶμα καλεῖται. Εἴπερ οὖν κατ' ἰδίαν μὲν τούτων οὐδέτερον ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῆς ἀμφοτέρων συμπλοκῆς καλεῖται ἄνθρωπος ...

110. *Vision* 29 (179, 13-15); 18 (174, 15-17); 19 (174, 24-25).

111. Johannes Hirschberger, «Geschichte der Philosophie» I Freiburg im. Br. 1961, p. 257-258.

112. *Hom.* 4, 9, ed. H. Dörries, E. Klostermann, M. Kroeger, p. 34. Ἐκαστον γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν σῶμά ἐστιν, ὁ ἄγγελος, ἡ ψυχὴ, ὁ δαίμων· ἔτι κἀν λεπτά ἐστιν, ὅμως ἐν ὑποστάσει καὶ χαρακτῆρα καὶ εἰκόνι κατὰ τὴν λεπτότητα τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν σῶματα τυγχάνει λεπτά. Ὡσπερ ἐν ὑποστάσει τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα παχὺ ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λεπτὴ οὕσα περιέλαβε τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν δι' οὗ δρᾷ τὸ οὖς δι' οὗ ἀκούει, ὁμοίως τὴν γλῶσσαν δι' ἧς λαλεῖ, τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἀπαξιαπλῶς πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὰ μέλη αὐτοῦ περιλαβούσα ἡ ψυχὴ συγκέκραται, δι' οὗ ἀπεργάζεται πάντα τὰ τοῦ βίου ἐπιτηδεύματα.

lights in the laws of the Spirit (Rom. 7, 22), while the organs of the flesh allow themselves to be seduced by temptation.<sup>113</sup> Elsewhere he repeats Paul's saying «with my intellect I serve the law of God but with the flesh the law of sin» (Rom. 7, 25).<sup>114</sup> It is clear that Diadochus observes a disunion between body and soul always in relation to the fallen man according to St. Paul, as an opposition between flesh and spirit because of sin.

By many modern scholars it is accepted that Paul did not believe in a metaphysical dualism but he followed the understanding of man common to Old Testament writers. John Robinson writes: «It is fairly generally conceded today that however much Paul may have drawn on Hellenistic sources for other parts of his doctrine, he is at any rate in his anthropology fundamentally what he describes himself, a Hebrew of the Hebrews. There are indeed individual words and extensions of usage which are to be explained from other sources. But the basic categories with which he works derive from the Old Testament view of man, and presuppose the question and interests upon which that view rests».<sup>115</sup>

In fact, in the Old Testament there is not an ontological contrast between the material and spiritual elements, body and soul, but man is treated as a psychosomatic organism. Even more, the Old Testament writers were not interested in a theoretical analysis of the components of man. The Old Testament speaks about man as a «living being» with many parts which are themselves conscious and active. There is no doubt that Paul's conception of man agrees with this view, but we find a kind of dualism in Pauline thought between flesh and spirit. For Paul the term σὰρξ (flesh) is not an equivalent of body neither the term πνεῦμα (spirit) the equivalent of soul. Thus when he describes τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκὸς (Gal. 5, 19-21) he does not relate them especially to the body. The term «flesh» in Paul's letters, as we said, means the whole man under the circumstances of the fall, while by the term «spirit» he sees man from the point of view of salvation. Consequently, both body and soul can be flesh or spirit. The Pauline dualism is not an opposition between matter and spirit but it is an antithesis between life and death. Sin has introduced in human nature this kind of dualism. Sin has created an alteration and change of man's nature, a disunion between soul and body which is ended in death.

113. *Cent.* 79 (137, 13-15).

114. *Cent.* 82 (141, 2-3; 25-29).

115. John Robinson, *The body. A study in Pauline Theology*, London 1952, p. 11.

In Diadochus' thought we find this Pauline dualism, a disunion of soul and body because of sin.<sup>116</sup> For Diadochus, ontologically speaking, the unity of body and soul is a basic characteristic which constitutes the human being. Thus man is designed to be a unity of body and soul.

As a man advances in the spiritual life the dualism between body and soul stops, and man can find the unity of his person as he was before the fall. The centre of the unity of the human being, the root of the active faculties of the intellect and of the will, and generally the source of all intellectual and spiritual activity, is the «heart». Diadochus, as we said, belongs to the «aesthetic» and not so much to the «intellectualist» tradition. One of the characteristics of Diadochus, and generally of the aesthetic school is the central role which he assigns to the «heart» rather than the «mind». Diadochus used the term «heart» in its biblical meaning, that is the centre of all man's psycho-physiological life, whereas in Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrius «heart» becomes a synonym of the Platonic terms mind or soul.<sup>117</sup>

The Old Testament writers (لِئب) and the Stoics (καρδία) made the heart the controlling element in man's constitution, the seat of the intellect and of thought. The Stoic Zeno supported this opinion because the expressive λόγος comes from man's breast; thus heart is the centre of man's intellect and soul.<sup>118</sup> However, in Diadochus' writings we find references to the central role of the heart. He describes the heart as the centre of man's personality where are born the fear and love of God. No one, says Diadochus, can love God consciously in his heart unless he has first feared Him with all his heart.<sup>119</sup> The love for God must express itself with full consciousness and certainty of heart, that is «with all thy heart and with all thy soul... and with all thy mind» (Luc. 10, 27).<sup>120</sup> He who loves God consciously in his heart is known by God (I

116. We notice here, that we find this Pauline dualism in many of the Fathers. See, for instance, in Maximus the Confessor, H.U.V. Balthasar *Kosmische Liturgie*, p. 199 and in John Climacus, Ch. Yannaras, 'Η μεταφυσική του σώματος, Athens, 1971, p. 68-69.

117. It should be noted that in Coptic, the language used by most of the monks of Egypt, the same word *hêt* is employed both for mind and heart. See T. K. Ware, *The ascetic writings of Mark the Hermit*. Oxford 1965, p. 254, n. 1.

118. Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Göttingen 1948, p. 86-87.

119. *Cent.* 16 (92, 15-16).

120. *Cent.* 40 (108, 15-17).

Cor. 8,3). Then his heart burns constantly with the fire of love.<sup>121</sup> Heart is the place in which the Holy Spirit reveals His feeling of warmth. It awakes in all parts of the soul a longing for God; its heat does not need to be felt by anything outside the heart, but through the heart it makes the whole man rejoice with a boundless love.<sup>122</sup> The depth of the heart is the place of continued remembrance of God.<sup>123</sup> But when man uses his senses without moderation they distract the heart from its remembrance of God.<sup>124</sup> Only he who dwells continually within his own heart is detached from the attractions of this world.<sup>125</sup> In outline Diadochus presents a whole programme of the mystical life. Christ is hidden in the heart from baptism, our aim must be to attend to the heart<sup>126</sup> and so discover the treasure of the kingdom that lies within us.

In the Macarian Homilies also the biblical meaning is given to the heart. Macarius describes the heart as a workshop of justice and injustice, the place of death and life... the palace of Christ.<sup>127</sup> According to Macarius the heart is a vessel which contains all the vices, but at the same time the palace of Christ. A distinguished scholar puts the matter very well: «without the heart which is the centre of all activity the spirit is powerless. Without the spirit, the heart remains blind, destitute of direction. It is therefore necessary to attain a harmonious relationship between the spirit and the heart, in order to develop and build up the personality in the life of grace, for the way of union is not a mere unconscious process and it presupposes an unceasing vigilance of Spirit and a constant effort of the will».<sup>128</sup>

121. *Cent.* 14 (91, 8).

122. *Cent.* 74 (133, 3-8).

123. *Cent.* 56 (117, 16-17); 59 (119, 16-17).

124. *Cent.* 56 (117, 3).

125. *Cent.* 57 (117, 25-26).

126. *Cent.* 64 (124, 11).

127. *Hom.* 15, 32-33 ed. H. Dörries, E. Klostermann, M. Kroeger, p. 146. ἐκεῖ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐργαστήριον τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, ἐκεῖ ἐστὶν ὁ θάνατος, ἐκεῖ ἐστὶν ἡ ζωὴ· ἐκεῖ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγαθὴ ἐμπορία καὶ ἡ ἐναντία ... τὸ παλάτιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἢ καρδία ἐστὶ.

128. V. Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, London, 1957, p. 200-201. Note that when Lossky refers here to «spirit», he means the French *esprit* i. e. the Greek νοῦς. On the term heart see A. Guillaumont, «Les sens des noms du coeur dans l' antiquité» in *Le coeur Études carmélitaines*, Bruges 1950, p. 41-81 and «Le Coeur chez les spirituels grecs à l' époque ancienne» in *D. S.* II 1952, 2281-8; K. Rahner, «Coeur de Jésus chez Origene» in *R.A.M.* 1934, p. 171-174.

## CHAPTER II

## THE FALL OF MAN

1. *The free will of Man.*

Man was not created perfect or imperfect. Through his creation he received from God all his gifts and abilities, but at the same time there was needed from his side his active will and co-operation. In this first state man could communicate with his Creator, but he had to develop and make permanent all his abilities and gifts. This is an important characteristic of Diadochus' anthropology which presents man as a dynamic person. For our author only God is good by nature; man can become good only through careful attention to his way of life and this depends on the extent to which he desires this.<sup>1</sup> God did not offer to man an obligatory perfection but he created him free, even though this freedom could be responsible for his fall.

Diadochus gives the following definition of self-determination: Αὐτεξουσιότης ἐστὶ ψυχῆς λογικῆς ἐτοιμῶς κινουμένη εἰς ὕπερ ἂν καὶ θέλοι.<sup>2</sup> That is, self-determination is a willing of the rational soul, tending by deliberate choice, towards whatever it wants. In other words, the will is absolutely free to choose between good and evil. Maximus the Confessor in defining self-determination twice cites closely the above definition<sup>3</sup> given by Diadochus. According to Maximus this freedom of choice is already a sign of imperfection, a limitation of our true freedom. A perfect nature has no need of choice, for it knows naturally what is good. Its freedom is based on this knowledge.<sup>4</sup>

For Diadochus any kind of predestination is unknown, as also is the Stoic doctrine of fate καθ' εἰμαρμένην ἀνάγκη. In fact, he teaches

1. *Cent.* 2 (85, 17-22). Φύσει ἀγαθὸς μόνος ὁ Θεός ἐστιν. Γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἐπιμελείας τῶν τρόπων ἀγαθὸς διὰ τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ, εἰς ὕπερ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀλλασσόμενος.

2. *Cent.* 5 (86, 18-19).

3. Maximus the Confessor, *Opuscula Theologica et polemica*, PG 91, 277C; *Disputatio cum Pyrrho*, PG 91, 301C.

4. See V. Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, London, 1957, p. 125.

that the free will is constantly put to the test, ὑπὸ δοκιμῆν εἶναι αἰεὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου φρονήματος.<sup>5</sup> God allows the demons to attack even one who has reached the measures of perfection, and leaves him so that his free will shall not be completely constrained by the bounds of grace.<sup>6</sup> Therefore man is completely free to choose good if he wants to be good.<sup>7</sup> St. Basil teaches the same opinion on free will ... Θεῶ τίνων οὐ τὸ ἡναγκασμένον φίλον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀρετῆς κατορθούμενον. Ἀρετὴ δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται. Προαίρεσις δὲ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἤρτηται. Τὸ δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον.<sup>8</sup>

The cure of the human will, after the fall, is the main subject of the ascetic tradition and of Diadochus. Man's free will must obey the commandments of God... ὁ καρπὸς τῶν αὐτεξουσιῶν ἐν ὑποταγῇ τελείᾳ παρ' αὐτῶν προσενηχθῆ τῷ Θεῷ.<sup>9</sup> According to Diadochus good is more powerful than the habit of evil.<sup>10</sup> This is an optimistic point of view in our author's thought, but since the fall man's will does not recognise the good easily and usually turns to bad. Therefore, the purpose of the Christian life is to direct the human will deliberately only towards what is good so that man will always destroy the remembrance of evil with good thoughts.<sup>11</sup>

## 2. *The problem of evil.*

The problem of evil has played an important role in Christian thought and it is connected especially with anthropology. For this reason, let us examine Diadochus' teaching on evil, as far as it concerns his conception of man.

5. *Cent.* 82 (142, 16-17).

6. *Cent.* 85 (145, 13-19) ... ἵνα τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ πᾶν μὴ ᾖ δεδεμένον τῷ δεσμῷ τῆς χάριτος. *Cent.* 95 (158, 6-9) ... οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαστικῶς, τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἡμῶν προμαλάξει ἢ χάρις ...

7. *Cent.* 76 (134, 23-25).

8. St. Basil, *Hom. Quod Deus non est auctor Malorum* PG 31, 345. See also the corresponding passage of John of Damascus, *De Fide Orth.* PG 94, 924, A-B: Ἐποίησε δὲ αὐτὸν φύσει ἀναμάρτητον, καὶ θελήσει αὐτεξούσιον. Ἀναμάρτητον δὲ φημί, οὐχ ὡς μὴ ἐπιδεχόμενον ἁμαρτιᾶν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν ἔχοντα, ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει δὲ μᾶλλον· ἦτοι ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντα μένειν, καὶ προκόπτειν ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τῇ θεῷ συνεργούμενον χάριτι ὁσαύτως καὶ τρέπεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῷ κακῷ γίγνεσθαι, τοῦ Θεοῦ παραχωροῦντος διὰ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον.

9. *Vision* 23 (179, 19-20). See also *Cent.* 4 (86, 11-14).

10. *Cent.* 3 (86, 7) ... δυνατωτέρα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις τοῦ καλοῦ τῆς ἕξεως τοῦ κακοῦ.

11. *Cent.* 5 (86, 19-21).

According to Diadochus the world, visible and invisible, is created by God. God is the only one creator of every being. The theory according to which evil is another metaphysical principle, unoriginated and self-existent alongside God, is unknown to our author. Nor does he accept that evil is created by God. Evil does not really exist. Much more, nor is any man naturally evil. Ontologically, there is not any place for evil because it has no existence in reality. Thus evil has no existence because it was not created by God or by any other principle. Evil starts to exist only through the refusal of good by the human will. In the beginning it appears in the desire of man's heart and afterwards takes form and begins to exist as a reality in the world. From this moment evil starts to work as an inclination, and man can follow evil easily. Diadochus particularly uses the phrase «memory of evil» *μνήμη τοῦ κακοῦ* by which he means the occupation of human conscience by the evil thought, and the phrase *ἔξις τοῦ κακοῦ* «habit of evil», that means the complete weakness of the human will toward good. The evil then is *ἔξις* (habit of evil), and through the memory of God it is possible to avoid evil. As we said, the power of good is stronger than the inclination to evil because the one has existence while the other has not, except when we bring it into action. Here we quote the whole of chapter three: *Τὸ κακὸν οὔτε ἐν φύσει ἐστὶν οὔτε μὴν φύσει τίς ἐστι κακός· κακὸν γὰρ τι ὁ Θεὸς οὐκ ἐποίησεν. "Ὅτε δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῆς καρδίας εἰς εἰδός τι φέρει τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν οὐσίᾳ, τότε ἄρχεται εἶναι ὅπερ ἂν ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν θέλοι. Δεῖ οὖν τῇ ἐπιμελείᾳ τῆς μνήμης τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀμελεῖν τῆς ἔξεως τοῦ κακοῦ· δυνατωτέρα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις τοῦ καλοῦ τῆς ἔξεως τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πράττεσθαι.<sup>12</sup>* In fact, between good and evil there is not only a difference but a complete opposition because evil has not its own existence; it begins to exist only through the human refusal of good. Thus evil has as its source and beginning the free will of reasonable beings. The same ideas about evil we find in patristic thought, which does not recognise the autonomous existence of evil.<sup>13</sup>

Diadochus is very clear and explicit in his ideas about evil. He

12. *Cent.* 3 (86, 2-9).

13. We quote only some very characteristic passages from St. Basil, *Hom. In Hexaemeron* 2, 4 PG 29, 37D: *τὸ κακὸν ἐστὶν οὐχὶ οὐσία ζῶσα καὶ ἐμψυχος, ἀλλὰ διάθεσις ἐν ψυχῇ ἐναντίως ἔχουσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν, διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀπόπτωσιν τοῖς βραθύμοις ἐγγινομένη.* See also *Hom. Quod Deus non est auctor malorum* 5 PG 31, 341B: *οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὑφ'εστώς, ὡσπερ τι ζῶον, ἢ πονηρία· οὔτε οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἐνυπόστατον παραστήσαι ἔχομεν. Στέρησις γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.*

especially emphasizes his teaching on this subject to repel the Messalian deviation in this matter. Theodoret of Cyr accuses the Messalians of being Manichaeans<sup>14</sup> and one of the propositions attacked by John of Damascus is definitely dualist: ἔτι φύσει τὰ κακά.<sup>15</sup> The acceptance of evil's existence by itself according to the Messalians gave the opportunity to our author to express his ideas clearly. We notice here that in the Macarian Homilies we do not find the above Messalian deviation but the orthodox view. Οἱ λέγοντες ἐνυπόστατον τὸ κακὸν οὐδὲν ἴσασι. Θεῶ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ κακὸν ἐνυπόστατον κατὰ τὸ ἀπαθὲς αὐτοῦ καὶ θεϊκόν.<sup>16</sup>

Ontologically non-existent, evil became reality first by the fall of the spiritual beings. The nature of angels was created by God from the beginning mutable and capable of possible change and alteration. Unfortunately by using their free will some of them became enslaved to passions and thus they fell.<sup>17</sup> From this moment the free will of the spiritual beings produced evil as a reality in the world. John of Damascus expresses the above idea very clearly in the passage below: ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγελικῶν δυνάμεων... (ὁ Σατανᾶς) οὐ φύσει πονηρὸς γεγονώς, ἀλλ' ἀγαθὸς ὢν, καὶ ἐπ' ἀγαθῶ γενόμενος, ... αὐτεξουσίῳ προαιρέσει ἐτράπη ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐπήρθη κατὰ τοῦ πεποιηκότος αὐτὸν Θεοῦ, ἀντᾶραι αὐτῶ βουληθείς· καὶ πρῶτος ἀποστάς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐν τῷ κακῷ ἐγένετο. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ κακόν, εἰ μὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στέρησις.<sup>18</sup> For Diadochus while they were created good, through their fall they changed their enjoyment into shame<sup>19</sup> and they became bad in will and action for ever. The others who remained good are immutable and above senses and passions.<sup>20</sup> Diadochus distinguishes the Devils into two categories. Some of them, he says, are more subtle, others more material in nature. The more subtle demons attack the soul while the others hold the flesh captive through their lascivious enticements. But both have the same propensity to inflict harm on mankind.<sup>21</sup> The evil

14. Theodoret of Cyr, *Haereticarum fabularum compendium* 4, 11 PG 83, 429-432.

15. John of Damascus, *De haeresibus compendium* 80 PG 94, 729-732, prop. 13.

16. *Hom.* 16, 1 ed. H. Dörries, E. Klostermann, M. Kroeger, p. 158.

17. *Vision* 23 (176, 10-12).

18. John of Damascus, *De fide Orth.* 2, 4 PG 94, 873-876A.

19. *Vision* 18 (174, 23): τὴν εὐφροσύνην αὐτῶν εἰς εἶδος αἰσχρόνης ἐκτήσαντο.

20. *Vision* 23 (176, 12-16): οἱ μὴ συναπαχθέντες τῇ ἀποστασίᾳ ἀσινεῖς διεφυλάχθησαν εἰς ἀπάθειαν, κρείττονές εἰσι καὶ αἰσθήσεων, ἐν ἡδονῇ δὲ τινὶ ἀτρέπτου δόξης ὑπέρχουσι.

21. *Cent.* 81 (139, 2-9).



spirits attack very strenuously. Diadochus uses military phrases to make more real the spiritual struggle between Devils and man.<sup>22</sup> He speaks, for instance, of the arrows of the demons which bring burning pains.<sup>23</sup> He also maintains that the Devil, to succeed in his purposes, changes his appearance into light or he takes fiery form *σχημα πυροειδές*.<sup>24</sup> For this reason he calls the Devil the spirit of error.<sup>25</sup> According to Diadochus, before baptism, grace encourages the soul towards good from the outside, while Satan lives inside, but from the moment of baptism the demon is outside, grace is within,<sup>26</sup> but even after baptism he is permitted to act upon man. The demons capture the soul by violence through the bodily senses, especially when they find us faint-hearted in pursuing the spiritual path.<sup>27</sup> On the other hand by evil thoughts they act against the human soul.

The ascetical literature has special terms to define the influence of the evil spirit on man. Evagrius was the first who has written about the eight basic sins — evil thoughts, which are: gluttony, luxury, love of money, sadness, anger, acedia, vainglory, pride.<sup>28</sup> Diadochus speaks about the evil thoughts *δαμονικῶν λογισμῶν*<sup>29</sup> but he does not reproduce any specific Evagrian enumeration.

In conclusion, evil previously non-existent, through the fall of the spiritual beings, became reality in the world and since then it acts against God's will.

### 3. *Original sin and its effects.*

Diadochus has little to say about the circumstances of the fall and its effects. He uses a number of different phrases when referring to original sin as *παράβασις τοῦ Ἀδάμ, τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπείας παρακοῆς ἔγκλημα, ὁ τῆς παρακοῆς ὄλισθος, πρώτην ἀπάτην*.

22. *Cent.* 98 (160, 12-20).

23. *Cent.* 97 (159, 14); 85 (144, 22).

24. *Cent.* 36 (105, 14). See also Evagrius, *De Oratone* PG 79 1181A-BD, 1184A.

25. *Cent.* 33 (103, 18); 75 (133, 21).

26. *Cent.* 79 (134, 11-13).

27. *Cent.* 79 (137, 17-20).

28. See Evagrius, *De octo spiritibus malitiae* PG 79, 1145A-1164D. See also I. Hausherr, «L'origine de la théorie Orientale des huit pechés capitaux» in *O.C.P.* 80, 1933, p. 164-175.

29. *Cent.* 77 (135, 19).

He seems to regard the story of Genesis as authentic history.<sup>30</sup> He says that God placed man in Paradise, giving him a special law to steady his will. The commandment of God showed the way which the first human beings should follow. As long as Adam and Eve did not look at the forbidden tree with desire, they were able to keep God's commandment. Unfortunately, instead of keeping God's law they allowed themselves to be distracted by the material world which was closer to them, particularly by the use, without moderation, of their bodily senses. Eve first looked at the forbidden tree with longing desire and then tasted its fruit with active sensuality; and she at once felt drawn to physical intercourse and she gave way to her passion. All her desire was then to enjoy what was immediately present to her senses and she involved Adam in her fall.<sup>31</sup> Diadochus definitely suggests that the fall was in some measure connected with sexual desire, that is taking *σωματική συμπλοκή* to mean sexual intercourse and not the condition of being embodied. He also mentions clearly that the essence of Adam's sin consisted in disobedience to the will of God. Adam rejected humility and for this reason he fell.<sup>32</sup> As we said, his original freedom implied the possibility of the fall. Thus man fell freely and he alone is responsible for his fall, and in particular his own will. Of course, we have to take into account the Devil's assault. The Devil incited the fall but man fell freely. John of Damascus, in his classic Reformulation of Greek Theology in the eighth century, very clearly pointed out the same view:... ἐντολῆς παράβασις ἁμαρτία ἐστίν. Αὕτη δὲ διὰ τῆς τοῦ διαβόλου προσβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀβιάστου καὶ ἐκουσίου παραδοχῆς συνίσταται.<sup>33</sup> Since the fall, sin is the parasite of nature placed in the human will.

The fall of man has nothing to do with any change of human nature; it is only an event that is concerned with the relationship between God and man. It is separation from God and His communion. On the other hand, it is a fall from the way of perfection and finally inclination to evil. The fall must not be examined from a juridical point of view: that is, we accept God's punishment as a result of our sin. Diadochus and the Eastern Fathers examine the fall according to the

30. Most of the Fathers had also accepted the story recorded in Genesis as an historical event; Origen and Gregory of Nyssa are the first who transform it into a cosmic myth.

31. *Cent.* 56 (117, 2-16).

32. *Cent.* 41 (109, 1-2).

33. John of Damascus, *De fide Orth.* 4, 22 PG 94, 1197c-1200A.

usual biblical tradition. The juridical conception of the fall in philosophical terms has entered Western Theology through Augustine, who thought of the whole subject from the point of the commandment of God, its violation by man, and finally the entrance of death as the penalty of sinners by God.<sup>34</sup>

What are the effects of the original sin? According to Diadochus, as a result of Adam's fall, the lineaments of man's soul, that is the image of God in man, was befouled;<sup>35</sup> But it is not so much annihilated as lost to sight, like a picture overlaid with dirt. However, it is far from being completely destroyed.

Since Adam's disobedience, all mankind inherited a certain duality of the will τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς θελήσεως. Diadochus maintains that the perceptive faculty natural to the human soul is single but it is split into two distinct modes of operation as a result of the fall.<sup>36</sup> Thus one side of the soul is carried away by the passionate part in man, but the other side of the soul frequently delights in the activity of the intellect.<sup>37</sup>

The intellect also fell into a state of duality. It has been forced to produce at one and the same moment both good and evil thoughts even against its own will; while the intellect tried to think constantly of what is good, it suddenly recollects what is bad.<sup>38</sup> This has not happened because of human nature, but as a result of the primal deception, the remembrance of evil has become a habit.<sup>39</sup>

In addition to that the natural psychosomatic unity is broken. The fall introduced into man's being an element of disintegration. Body and soul became two enemies. Diadochus, as we said, speaks often

34. See I. Romanides, *Τὸ Προπατορικὸν Ἀμάρτημα*, Athens 1957, pp. 111-115.

35. *Cent.* 78 (135, 22-24). Ἐπειδὴ οὖν διὰ τῆς παραβάσεως τοῦ Ἀδάμ οὐ μόνον αἱ γραμμαὶ τοῦ χαρακτῆρος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρρυπώθησαν ... Compare with *Cent.* 89 (149, 5-6). See also *Epiph.*, *haer.* 70, 3 GCS p. 235-236; Gregory of Nyssa, *Ving.* 12 ed. Jaeger, p. 301.

36. *Cent.* 25 (96, 19-20; 97, 1). Μίαν μὲν εἶναι αἰσθησιν φυσικὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ... εἰς δύο λοιπὸν διὰ τὴν παρακοὴν τοῦ Ἀδάμ διαιρουμένην ἐνεργείας.

37. *Cent.* 29 (100, 1-6).

38. *Cent.* 88 (148, 12-18). Ἀφ' οὗ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς γνώσεως ἀπωλίσθησεν, ἀνάγκην ἔχει ἕκαστε, κἂν μὴ θέλη κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ῥοπήν καὶ καλὰ καὶ φαῦλα φέρειν διανοήματα.

... Ὡς γὰρ σπεύδει αἰεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐννοεῖν, εὐθὺς καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ μέμνηται, ἐπειδὴ εἰς διπλὴν τινα ἐννοίαν ἐσχίσται ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀδάμ παρακοῆς ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μνήμη.

39. *Cent.* 83 (143, 2-5) ... ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰς ἕξιν ἔχουσα διὰ τὴν πρώτην ἅπαξ ἀπάτην τὴν μνήμην τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ ...

about the disunion between body and soul with the same meaning as Romans, Chapter 7.

Adam became the slave of the inferior elements of his own nature, the passions, instead of dominating them. The wholeness of man has been split. Man's free will has been distorted and weakened and his body became the place of sin. On the physical side man was made subject to pain, sickness and finally bodily death. Since the fall, death has been the mystery of human nature. In Diadochus' thought death is not the natural end of human existence; it is not a release from the body either, but the destruction of God's creation. He clearly says that the human body became subject to corruption as a result of Adam's sin.<sup>40</sup> This is the interpretation that all the Eastern Fathers give about death, which follows the Pauline view that is expressed in Romans 5, 12: ... ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντα ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν... Thus death did not come from God as many of the Western Theologians after St. Augustine thought.<sup>41</sup> In this case, the passage below from St. Basil is very characteristic of Eastern thought: ὅσον γὰρ ἀφίστατο τῆς ζωῆς τοσοῦτον προσῆγγιζε τῷ θανάτῳ. Ζωὴ γὰρ ὁ Θεός· στέρησις δὲ τῆς ζωῆς θάνατος. Ὡστε ἑαυτῷ τὸν θάνατον ὁ Ἀδάμ διὰ τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ κατεσκεύασε, κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον, ὅτι ἰδοὺ οἱ μακρύνοντες ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀπολοῦνται. Οὕτως οὐχὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἔκτισε θάνατον, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἑαυτοῖς ἐκ πονηρᾶς γνώμης ἐπεσπασάμεθα. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐκώλυσε τὴν διάλυσιν διὰ τὰς προσειρημένους αἰτίας, ἵνα μὴ ἀθάνατον ἡμῖν τὴν ἀρρωστίαν διατηρήσῃ.<sup>42</sup> God did not create man immortal or mortal but in between τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε θνητὸν ὁμολογουμένως, οὔτε ἀθάνατον γεγενῆσθαι φασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν μεθορίοις ἐκατέρας φύσεως...<sup>43</sup>

The sin of Adam deprived him of his communion with God, which was the most important event. This is the spiritual death for it signified alienation from God. Thus sin has introduced spiritual and bodily death into the world through the human will. Finally, we point out that the fall according to Diadochus is not, as we said, a complete change or destruction of human nature. The essence of change in

40. *Cent.* 78 (135, 21; 136, 1).

41. This is a fundamental difference between Eastern and Western tradition. The Western thought that death is a phenomenon from God while the Eastern believes that God did not make death.

42. St. Basil, *Hom. Quod Deus non est auctor malorum* 7, PG 31, 345. See also the Deuterocanonical book, *Wisdom of Solomon* 1, 13 and 2, 23.

43. Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 1 PG 40, 513.

man after the fall consisted in the habit of evil ἔξις τοῦ κακοῦ<sup>44</sup> and since then it became hard for man's intellect to remember God or His commandments.<sup>45</sup> Thus in Diadochus' vocabulary the phrase ἔξις τοῦ κακοῦ (habit of evil) stands as concupiscence making man turn from God and find fulfilment in evil.

When Diadochus refers to original sin and its effects, he thinks that it involved not only Adam but the descendants; in other words, he accepts the fall as a universal event that includes all the human race. He does not seem to accept that mankind inherits the παράβασις of Adam (in the sense of Adam's guilt), but only the consequences of this violation. Hence, they are all placed under sin and the fall introduces into the human race an inherited inclination towards evil and sin. Humanity is not responsible for Adam's sin, and Diadochus never said that we participate in Adam's actual guilt.<sup>46</sup> He does not accept either the Augustinian view according to which we were one with him when he sinned: «in the misdirected choice of that one man all sinned in him, since all were that one man from whom on that account they all severally derive original sin»;<sup>47</sup> and «all sinned in Adam on that occasion, for all were already identical with him in that nature of his which was endowed with the capacity to generate them».<sup>48</sup> Thus the many were made subject to corruption by one man's disobedience. This inheritance presupposes the unity of the human race with the first man, that is our solidarity with Adam, an idea with a long history going back through Irenaeus<sup>49</sup> to Paul.<sup>50</sup> In fact, in the background lies the Platonic conception of human nature as a universal. Cyril of Alexandria says that the reason why we are sinful is not that we actually sinned in Adam—that is out of the question, since we were not even born then—but that Adam's sin caused the nature which we inherit to be corrupted. The following passage from Cyril is a classical one of the Eastern tradition on the inheritance of the effects of original sin:

44. *Sermon* 6 (168, 18).

45. *Cent.* 56 (117, 16).

46. The Greek Fathers correctly interpreted ἐφ' ᾧ in Rom. 5, 12 as meaning «because», not «in whom» See. S. Lyonnet, «Les sens de ἐφ' ᾧ en Rom. 5, 12 et l'exégèse de Pères Grecs», in *Biblica*, Roma 1955, vol. 36, Fasc. 4.

47. *De nupt. et concup.* 2, 15.

48. *De pecc. mer. et remiss.* 3, 14.

49. *Adv. Haer.* 3, 18, 7 ed. A. Rousseau and L. Doutreleau, SC. vol. 211, Paris, 1974, p. 369-371.

50. *Rom.* 5, 12, 18, 19.

«Nature fell ill from sin through the disobedience of the one man, Adam. And the multitude was made sinful not through having partaken in Adam's sin—they did not exist yet— but through partaking in his nature fallen under the law of sin. As in Adam, man's nature contracted the illness of corruption through disobedience, because through disobedience passions entered man's nature.<sup>51</sup>»

In addition, Diadochus thinks of the fall from the point of view of salvation. The fact now is that God has already opened a new life for man under the light of incarnation.

*(To be continued)*

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51. Cyril of Alex. *In Rom.* 5, 18 PG 78, 789.